dissenting:
I
The majority has concluded that the trial court abused its discretion concerning the voir dire examination, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to ask the three questions tendered by the defendant. The second question involved a question of law (People v. Phillips (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 362, 425 N.E.2d 1040), and the third question was argumentative and properly refused. The fourth question was also properly refused, and the court was correct in telling the jury that the case involved the insanity defense and asking the jurors whether they could give both sides a fair trial. The manner and scope of voir dire examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Teague (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d 1066.) I am not convinced that the court erred in refusing to propound the three questions tendered by the defendant in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. See People v. Pitts (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 451, 432 N.E.2d 1062.
II
The majority has also concluded that the admission of evidence and arguments relating to the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent constitutes an intolerable penalty on defendant’s exercise of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The State asserts that the prosecutor made the remark that defendant “all of a sudden” exercised his right to remain silent to support the State’s contention that defendant was coherent and aware of his rights immediately following the murders. The State further asserts that defendant did not remain silent following his arrest, but instead gave statements and acted in a manner which was inconsistent with defendant’s claim of insanity. The State cites defendant’s actions at the time of his arrest, his confession to Detective Foley following the murders, and his extensive statements to defense psychiatrists. Defendant did not remain silent and was in touch with reality, and as such, the prosecutor did not improperly comment on defendant’s right to remain silent. The State argues alternatively that, even if defendant did assert his right to remain silent, that evidence was highly probative of defendant’s mental state and was needed to rebut evidence of defendant’s insanity following the murders. I agree with the State’s position, and any error in admitting the evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The cases cited by the majority stand for general propositions of law and are of little help here. See Sulie v. Duckworth (7th Cir. 1982), 689 F.2d 128; People v. Spicer (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 173, 402 N.E.2d 169; People v. Vanda (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 551, 444 N.E.2d 609.
Ill
The majority holds that it was error for the State’s expert, Dr. Tuteur, to comment upon the testimony of another witness, Peter Bukiri, a friend of defendant’s, who testified regarding the defendant’s conduct on the day before the murders. Following Dr. Tuteur’s response, defense counsel objected and the trial judge questioned how Dr. Tuteur could give such an opinion. Defendant argues that it was for the jury, not for Dr. Tuteur, to draw whatever inferences existed in Bukiri’s testimony. Defendant further argues that Dr. Tuteur’s testimony bolstered the State’s motive evidence concerning the defendant’s marital disputes and was therefore prejudicial. The State, however, argues that the opinion testimony drew an obvious inference from the evidence adduced at trial and therefore was not prejudicial. (People v. Sprinkle (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 456, 393 N.E.2d 94.) After a review of the record, I find the error, if any, to be harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s sanity at the time of the murders. Cf. People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 559, 338 N.E.2d 171.
IV
Defendant also objects to several comments made by the prosecutor during the final argument. The defendant claims that the remarks misled the jury into believing that if defendant was acquitted for reasons of insanity, he would be immediately returned to society. Defendant therefore maintains that the remarks were a misstatement of the law and thereby prejudicial.
In People v. Greer (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203, the Supreme Court did not find that similar comments were reversible error, and People v. Wilson (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 950, 458 N.E.2d 1081, does not support the conclusion of the majority in the case at bar. In my view, People v. Wilson does not stand for the proposition that the comments of the prosecutor, standing alone, constitute reversible error. Under the facts of People v. Wilson, when a close question was presented on the key issue of the defendant’s sanity at the time of the occurrence, other factors peculiar to that case (denial of request for continuances and in quashing subpoenas) prompted the court in granting a new trial.
V
Finally, the evidence presented in this case was not closely balanced, and the errors complained of were not of such a magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. The record and the evidence presented support the finding of guilty, as the State has met its burden in this case. I do not agree with the majority that the errors complained of constitute reversible error, and I would affirm the conviction.