specially concurring:
I agree with the majority’s analysis as to section 5 — 8—7(b) and, therefore, agree we should credit the defendant with additional time served; however, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of section 5 — 8—7(c) and believe that as to that section Roberson controls. I analyze section 5 — 8—7(c) first.
Section 5 — 8—7(c) provides as follows:
“An offender arrested on one charge and prosecuted on another charge for conduct which occurred prior to [the offender’s] arrest shall be given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the minimum term of imprisonment for time spent in custody under the former charge not credited against another sentence.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—7(c) (West 2000).
I believe section 5 — 8—7(c) is clear that, if an offender is arrested on one charge and then prosecuted on a different charge, to receive credit on the second charge for the entire time spent in custody, the conduct that resulted in the second charge must have occurred prior to the initial arrest. In our case the conduct that resulted in the charge of violation of bail bond did not occur prior to the arrest for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Because defendant was first arrested for aggravated criminal sexual abuse but then prosecuted for violation of bail bond, the language of section 5 — 8—7(c) does not provide credit for time served on the aggravated criminal sexual abuse charge.
As I stated earlier, Roberson is directly on point and the Roberson majority’s analysis of section 5 — 8—7(c) is sound. In Roberson the defendant originally bonded out on a burglary charge and was later prosecuted for violation of bail bond. The majority in Roberson held that section 5 — 8—7(c) did not provide credit for time served on the burglary charge. Similarly, I do not believe section 5 — 8—7(c) provides for credit, in our case, on the aggravated criminal sexual abuse charge.
The majority in Roberson, however, did not discuss subsection (b) of section 5 — 8—7. The first mention of subsection (b) in that case occurs in Justice Hutchinson’s dissent. In our case I note that the State has not addressed — other than saying that the argument is waived— defendant’s analysis of section 5 — 8—7(b).
Subsection (b) of section 5 — 8—7 provides that a defendant “shall be given credit *** for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—7(b) (West 2000). I agree with the majority in our case that, although the State did not formally charge defendant with violating his bail bond until August 14, 2001, the “offense” occurred in March 1999 and defendant was in custody on that offense once he was arrested on April 14, 2001, for jumping bail. Accordingly, under subsection (b), I believe defendant is entitled to credit from April 14, 2001, and I agree the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County should be modified to reflect that credit.
As a final matter, I disagree with the majority’s comment that “the State manipulated defendant’s liberty when it allowed him to remain in custody for approximately four months without bail before formally charging him with violating his bail bond.” 345 Ill. App. 3d at 170. There is no evidence in this record that the State manipulated defendant’s liberty; on the contrary, the record reflects that defendant was absent for over two years and after his arrest the State attempted to locate the victim in Mexico and to bring her back to testify, but it was unable to do so. It was only then that the State charged defendant with the lower class felony of violating bail bond.