dissenting:
In- the first appeal, 30 Ill App2d 243, it was pointed out that the sole objective of the citation proceeding was to determine the ownership of the stock, and this could be determined only after a full hearing. Accordingly, we directed that Mrs. Hill be allowed to testify.
When the case was retried before Judge Seidel, Mrs. Hill was allowed to testify. Her appearance and demeanor were observed by the court. She was afforded every opportunity to prove that the stock had been given to her. Only after a full and complete hearing did Judge Seidel resolve the issue of whether or not a gift had been established.
The majority here has decided that Mrs. Hill has met the burden of proving the inter vivos gift by clear and convincing evidence and that the lower court’s decision was manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
There are minor inaccuracies in Mrs. Hill’s testimony which taken alone would not cast great doubt upon her words, but, there is little affirmative convincing evidence that she possessed the stocks at all before her husband’s death. She testified uncontradicted that she picked up the stocks on July 14. But, the records of the bank show no record of her presence in the vault upon that date. Nor is the testimony of Mr. Keig of any clear corroborative value. He testified that Mr. Hill had told him two or three times in the last year of his life that “he had placed the stoek in her hands.” But, she only held it according to her own testimony from July 14th to August 30th of that year and that Mr. Keig would have seen him five or six times when he was sick to discuss it seems improbable. This does not necessarily lead us to the conclusion that there was a physical transfer. Hill could just as well have told his wife to get the stocks after his death. Indeed, for all we know, the only time Mrs. Hill every stepped foot in the Lake Shore Bank was on September 2, the first business day after her husband’s death.
The court below was the trier of fact. There were numerous factors to be weighed. To be against the manifest weight of the evidence requires that an opposite conclusion be clearly evident. Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., 331 Ill App 143, 72 NE 2d 705; Olin Industries, Inc. v. Wuellner, 1 Ill App 2d 267, 117 NE2d 565; Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill App 2d 412, 128 NE2d 363; Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill App2d 311, 146 NE2d 205. I am unable to agree that the court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.