dissenting:
The majority opinion holds that "defendant has made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated so as to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on the disparity between his death sentence and LaBoy’s life sentence.” 179 Ill. 2d at 217. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding on this issue. For the reasons that follow, I find that the circuit court properly dismissed defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief. See People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 220 (1991) (the reasons provided by the trial court for its judgment are immaterial if the decision is correct).
The facts as set forth in this court’s opinion on direct appeal (People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23 (1984)) reveal that defendant, Luis Ruiz, Placido LaBoy and Nelson Aviles, all members of the Latin Kings, committed the murders of Arthur and Michael Salcido and Frank Mussa. Defendant and his companions encountered the three victims when Michael Salcido approached Luis Ruiz and asked him where he could purchase marijuana. Michael told defendant and his companions that he was a member of a rival street gang, the Latin Eagles, because he believed they were members of that gang. Defendant and his companions got into one of the victim’s cars on the pretense that they would help the victims buy marijuana. Defendant and his companions had the car driven to an alley where they instructed Michael to get out of the car and follow them to buy some marijuana. While they were alone with Michael, defendant and his companions beat him. Upon returning to the car, defendant and the others decided to kill Michael and his friends because they had seen their faces and could identify them. Michael and Frank were taken out of the car by defendant and LaBoy. When defendant returned to the car, he watched while Aviles stabbed Arthur. Frank was then brought to the car. Ultimately, defendant encouraged LaBoy to cut Frank’s throat. Defendant then retrieved Michael and brought him to the car containing the bodies of Arthur and Frank. Defendant pushed Michael into the car, pulled back his head, slit his throat and stabbed him in the chest several times.
As noted in the majority opinion, defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief alleged that his death sentence was unconstitutionally disparate from the natural life sentence received by LaBoy because LaBoy played a more culpable role in the murders, had a more significant criminal record and less rehabilitative potential than defendant. 179 Ill. 2d at 216. This court has repeatedly commented that simply because "some or all of the members of [a codefendant’s] sentencing jury chose not to impose the death penalty in [the codefendant’s] case does not, in our view, render the defendant’s own sentence disproportionate.” See People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 46 (1994). From this court’s recitation of the facts on direct appeal, it is evident that defendant’s claim of unconstitutional disparity in sentencing is not supported. Defendant alleges that LaBoy was the ringleader and implies that he was only a follower. Evidence that a defendant is a follower, as opposed to a leader, has been held to be a significant factor in disparate sentencing analysis. See People v. Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d 43, 125 (1991). The facts in this case, however, refute defendant’s claim. They show that defendant encouraged LaBoy to slash one of the victim’s throats and then proceeded to slash another victim’s throat himself and repeatedly stab that victim. As noted by this court on direct appeal, defendant was an active, willing participant in all three of the murders. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d at 42. Defendant has thus failed to show that he was merely a follower and that LaBoy was more culpable.
The facts, as revealed in this court’s opinion on direct appeal, also provide some insight into defendant’s character. The facts show that defendant is a ruthless killer, who exhibited no remorse for his actions. Following his statement to the police, defendant expressed a willingness to kill again. When asked if he had a chance to do it over " 'would he do it again,’ ” defendant stated that he would " 'if it was a sure thing.’ ” Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d at 46. Defendant’s only regret was that he was caught. Defendant’s statements expressing a lack of remorse reveal that defendant had little rehabilitative potential. In light of the facts regarding defendant’s actions during the murder and his character, LaBoy’s allegedly more severe criminal record, standing alone, does not render defendant’s death sentence arbitrarily and unreasonably disparate with that of LaBoy’s life sentence. See People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 481 (1996).
I would therefore find that defendant failed to establish that the sentence of death imposed on him is unconstitutionally disparate from LaBoy’s life sentence. As such, defendant’s petition fails to make a substantial showing that defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated. I would therefore affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s claim of unconstitutional sentence disparity.
JUSTICES MILLER and HEIPLE join in this dissent.