concurring.
I agree with the majority determination which affirms the Theft conviction. I do not, however, agree that under the circumstances of the case before us, the "recent, exclusive possession rule", is inapplicable.
The "other incriminating evidence" which the majority utilizes to support the conviction, is nothing more or less than additional circumstantial evidence disclosing the control-"plus" necessary for implementation of the "recent, exclusive possession rule".
The elapsed time between the theft and apprehension was as little as one (1) hour and not more than four (4) hours. The distance between the site of the theft and the place of arrest was only two (2) miles. The stolen merchandise was observed in plain view in the automobile owned and driven by Strode. Under existing case law, these facts, coupled with the other circumstances, permit application of the guilt inference. Vaughn v. State (1971) 255 Ind. 678, 266 N.E.2d 219. See also Gann v. State (1971) 256 Ind. 429, 269 N.E.2d 381 (burglary).
If my assessment of the evidence is correct, or if it is even close, the conclusion seems to follow. This is not to say that the conclusion is logical, sensible, or just. It is only to say that it is indicated by case law in Indiana. See Gaddie v. State (24 Dist. 1980) Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 788.