dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial eourt abused its discretion in admitting Sams’ entire motor vehicle driving record into evidence. It is from the majority’s conclusion that the.admission of this evidence was harmless that I respectfully dissent.
An error is not harmless if it prejudices the defendant’s substantial rights. Bonner v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ind.1995); See also Ind.Trial Rule 61. In determining whether the defendant’s substantial rights were prejudiced, we must assess the probable impact of the improperly admitted evidence upon the jury. Bonner, 650 N.E.2d at 1141. The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt sufficient to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction. Id. A reversal may be required if the record as a whole discloses that the erroneously admitted evidence was likely to have had a prejudicial impact upon the mind of the average juror, thereby contributing to the verdict. Id.
In my opinion, despite other evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the erroneously admitted record was likely to have had an impact upon the jury such that it prejudiced Sams’ *1327substantial rights. Conflicting evidence was presented to the jury regarding whether Sams or his brother operated the vehicle during the period in question. The jury, faced with the responsibility of determining the facts and weighing the credibility of witnesses, was subjected to highly prejudicial evidence of Sams’ driving record consisting of numerous serious offenses, including reckless driving and operating a vehicle while his driving privileges were suspended, operating while intoxicated, and operating as an habitual traffic offender. This evidence of extrinsic offenses and bad acts was substantial and undoubtedly focused the jury’s attention on Sams’ character and his propensity to commit driving offenses rather than the conduct for which he was charged. In view of the nature, scope, and number of offenses contained in the exhibit at issue, I cannot conclude that there was no substantial likelihood that this evidence contributed to the conviction, and thus I decline to find the error harmless.
Furthermore, I do not believe that Humphrey v. State, 680 N.E.2d 836 (Ind.1997) supports the majority’s conclusion that the error in question was harmless. In Humphrey, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jury not to consider a witness’ prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence. Id. at 839. Our supreme court found that Ind.Evidence Rule 105 places the onus for securing a limiting admonition on the parties, and concluded that the defendant’s failure to request an admonition waived any error based upon the absence of such an admonition. Id. Humphrey did not involve a determination of whether erroneously admitted evidence prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant. Thus, Humphrey is not applicable to the case at bar.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.