(dissenting). I dissent. The court’s decision to *985permit — and even encourage — the jurors informally to view evidentiary exhibits during times when neither the Judge nor the parties were present was an unwarranted departure from acceptable trial practice that, in both form and substance, deprived defendant of his constitutional and statutory right to be present at all material stages of trial (see, Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105-106; People v Ciaccio, 47 NY2d 431; CPL 260.20). Since that right is one that must be enforced by the appellate courts even in the absence of a timely and specific objection or a showing of actual prejudice (see, People v Antommarchi, 80 NY2d 247, 250), the judgment of conviction should be reversed.
It is beyond dispute that the reception of evidence is a material stage of trial at which the defendant’s presence is required (e.g., People v Ciaccio, supra, at 436). It is clearly a "core” stage of the criminal proceeding as to which the right to be present "serves a symbolic function” as well as affording the defendant an opportunity for meaningful participation (People v Morales, 80 NY2d 450, 456; see, People v Williams, 85 NY2d 945, 947; People v Sprowal, 84 NY2d 113, 116; People v Sloan, 79 NY2d 386, 392).
The majority does not take issue with this principle, but instead attempts to circumvent it by relying on the fact that "the jury examined the exhibits only after they had been received in evidence.” (Majority mem, at 984.) This analytical disposition, however, represents an overly formalistic — and entirely unrealistic — view of trial practice.
The formal reception of evidentiary exhibits occurs when they are tendered by counsel and determined to be legally admissible by the court. At that point, the exhibits are technically available for review and inspection by the jury. However, depending on their size and nature, the exhibits may not actually be examined by the jurors at that time. Instead, they may be passed around for close viewing immediately after the formalities of admission are completed or the viewing may be postponed for some later, more convenient time in the trial. In this case, for example, the record makes clear that on at least two occasions, the exhibits were admitted but were not actually seen by the jurors until the unsupervised viewings that are the subject of this appeal.
Given that the critical event for purposes of the fact-finding process is the jury’s actual exposure to the exhibits rather than the time when they are technically deemed "admitted” by the court, it follows that the defendant’s due process and *986statutory right to be present attaches at the former, as well as the latter, time. Indeed, it seems illogical and unreasonable to suggest that the defendant must be present during the formal tender and acceptance of exhibits for admission, but that his presence may be dispensed with when those exhibits are actually shown to the jury. Certainly, the jurors’ examination of the exhibits presents an occasion for meaningful participation by the accused, since their reactions are observable events that may well affect the defense’s trial strategy (see, People v Williams, supra, at 947 [defendant’s presence required where he or she "may assist counsel in evaluating and acting upon events which unfold during the course of the proceeding”]). For example, a defendant may notice a particular juror lingering for an unusually long time over a particular exhibit and, as a consequence, may suggest to his trial counsel that further exploration of the exhibit’s significance is required.
Even apart from the clear violation of defendant’s right to be present, the procedure utilized in this case for the viewing of exhibits represents such a drastic deviation from the normal organization of the court and mode of proceedings (see, People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288, 295), that the basic fairness of the proceeding itself is called into question. It is fundamental that "the supervision of a Judge is an important and nonwaivable element” of the right to a jury trial (People v Thompson, 90 NY2d 615, 621 [decided today]; see, People v Toliver, 89 NY2d 843; People v Ahmed, 66 NY2d 307). Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the Trial Judge’s presence is required for all judicial (as distinguished from ministerial) functions, not just those that are labeled "essential” (majority mem, at 984). Although the Trial Judge in this case gave the usual admonitory instructions before — although not necessarily immediately before— the unsupervised viewings occurred, there was still a need for judicial presence and supervision, since unexpected events, such as blurted-out comments or other spontaneous juror reactions, could have occurred, necessitating the Judge’s substantive intervention. Of course, because the viewings in this case were unobserved and unrecorded, there is no way of knowing whether anything untoward or prejudicial actually did occur.
I would note, moreover, that the informality of the procedure that the trial court sanctioned gives rise to a very realistic concern that substantive irregularities did, in fact, occur. For example, at one point, the Judge told the jurors that those who had not seen the exhibits earlier would "have a chance” to do so during an extended lunch break. The court’s casual *987approach suggested that the viewing was optional, raising the possibility that the evidence was viewed by some, but not all of the jurors — an infirmity that could require a mistrial (see, People v Adams, 179 AD2d 764 [juror grossly disqualified under CPL 270.35 where it was possible that he had missed portions of the testimony due to his dozing]).
Given the level of impropriety here and the risk of prejudice it created, it is unfortunate that the majority has chosen to sanction rather than condemn this Judge’s casual practice with regard to predeliberation viewings of exhibits. One can only hope that the majority’s decision to uphold the conviction in this case does not serve to encourage the use of periods when court is not formally in session for such viewings and other substantive procedures. Because I view such experimentation as inappropriate and likely to corrupt the “mode of proceedings” that has evolved over time to assure fair trials, and because I believe that this particular defendant’s right to be present was violated, I conclude that the proper appellate remedy is to reverse the judgment of conviction and to direct a new trial.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Smith, Levine, Ciparick and Wesley concur; Judge Titone dissents and votes to reverse in an opinion.
Order affirmed in a memorandum.