(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff has not lost an organ, and hence the exception in MCL 600.1483(1)(f); MSA 27A. 1483(1)(f) does not apply in this case. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s interpretation of the phrase “vital bodily function” in MCL 600.1483(1)(g); MSA 27A.1483(1)(g) and from its conclusion that the determination whether plaintiff has lost a vital bodily function is a jury question.
*492At the time of plaintiffs alleged injuries,1 MCL 600.1483(1); MSA 27A. 1483(1) provided in pertinent part:
In an action for damages alleging medical malpractice . . . damages for noneconomic loss which exceeds $225,000.00 shall not be awarded unless 1 or more of the following circumstances exist:
* * *
(g) The patient has lost a vital bodily function.
The majority concludes that the issue whether the plaintiff has lost a vital bodily function should be submitted to the trier of fact, regardless of whether there is a material factual dispute about the nature and extent of the injuries. However, it is well settled that statutory interpretation is a question of law for the court to determine. See, e.g., Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 454 Mich 626, 631; 563 NW2d 683 (1997); Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991); Rose Hill Center, Inc v Holly Twp, 224 Mich App 28, 32; 568 NW2d 332 (1997). Likewise, where the facts are undisputed, applying a statute to the facts is an issue of law for the court. Wills v State Farm Ins Cos, 437 Mich 205, 213; 468 NW2d 511 (1991) (Cavanagh, C.J.); Marcelle v Taubman, 224 Mich App 215, 217; 568 NW2d 393 (1997).
It is true that the Supreme Court departed from this general rule in DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d 896 (1986). In DiFranco, which arose under the no-fault act,2 the Court held, “If reasonable minds *493can differ as to whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of bodily function, the issue must be submitted to the jury, even if the evidentiary facts are undisputed.” Id. at 58. However, such an abandonment of the customary rule requiring the jury to decide the facts and the judge to construe the law is appropriate only where “compelling reasons” exist. Wills, supra at 210.
Subsequently, the Legislature amended the no-fault act to specifically provide that where there is no factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries, the question whether the person has suffered a serious impairment of bodily function is a question of law for the court. See 1995 PA 222, codified at MCL 500.3135(2)(a); MSA 24.13135(2)(a). In amending the law, the Legislature reasoned that the change would “produce more uniformity in decisions by allowing the judge to construct the statute rather than juries, which are more likely to vary in attitude based on geography or even one jury to the next.” House Legislative Analysis, HB 4341, December 18, 1995.
Furthermore, a primary reason for the Supreme Court’s departure in DiFranco from the general rule that statutory interpretation is a question of law for the court was its conclusion that the term “serious impairment” is not readily definable. DiFranco, supra at 50. Although it is not defined in the statute, I do not belieye that the phrase “vital bodily function” is similarly ambiguous.
In interpreting statutes, undefined words should be accorded their common and approved usage. MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1); Putkamer, supra at 631. When, as in this case, a word is not defined in the statute, a *494court may consult dictionary definitions. Marcelle, supra at 219. According to Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1992) “vital” means “1. of, pertaining to, or necessary to life ... 3. necessary to the existence, continuance, or well-being of something; indispensable; essential.” The American Heritage Dictionary: Second College Edition defines “vital” as “Necessary to the continuation of life; life-sustaining.” In the Attorneys’ Dictionary of Medicine, “vital” is defined as “Essential to life; pertaining to life.”
Given these definitions, I find unpersuasive the majority’s contention that the word “vital” is ambiguous. The phrase “loss of a vital bodily function” clearly means the loss of a function necessary to sustain life. While few, if any, would argue that the ability to walk is not an important bodily function, the ability to walk is not necessary to the continuation of life. Many people survive without the ability to walk. The majority’s contention that walking can be considered a “vital bodily function” is contrary to the common and approved usage of the words.
Furthermore, after finding that the phrase “vital bodily function” is ambiguous, the majority concludes, without any citation whatsoever, that the Legislature did not mean the phrase “loss of a vital bodily function” to mean loss of a function “necessary to life.” The majority merely asserts that a “definition of ‘vital’ that basically restricts the exception to those on life support or dialysis and those who received transplants was not intended by the Legislature.” Ante at 488. However, if the language used is clear, then the Legislature must have intended the meaning it has plainly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. Nation v W D E Electric Co, 454 Mich 489, *495494; 563 NW2d 233 (1997); Sanders v Delton Kellogg Schools, 453 Mich 483, 487; 556 NW2d 467 (1996). While the majority may prefer that the Legislature had chosen a less strict standard, the wisdom of the provision at issue is not a matter for our review. Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 142; 521 NW2d 230 (1994); American States Ins Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 220 Mich App 586, 597; 560 NW2d 644 (1996).
Finally, plaintiff claims that MCL 600.1483; MSA 27A.1483 violates both the constitution and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101 et seq. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that these issues are not ripe for our review.
I would affirm the trial court order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
The statute was amended by 1993 PA 78, effective April 1, 1994.
MCL 500.3101 et seq: MSA 24.13101 et seq.