dissenting:
I dissent. The facts in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975, People v. Hanna, 42 Ill.2d 323, and People v. Canaday, 49 Ill.2d 416, cited by the majority, do not remotely resemble the facts shown by this record. In each of those cases the arresting officer, at the time of apprehension, knew that a crime had been committed and had received descriptions of both the automobile involved and the alleged perpetrators. Here it is apparent from the arresting officer’s testimony that when he “requested” that defendant accompany him to the police station he did not even know that a crime had been committed, and that his request was motivated, not by reasonable grounds, but by suspicion. The majority, without citation of authority, states that the information which the police officer possessed “was sufficient to cause a reasonable man to believe that the articles in the defendant’s automobile were stolen property, and that other evidence of a crime could be found in the car. The police therefore had probable cause to search the automobile.” The reason for the absence of authority to support this unprecedented conclusion is obvious — there is none— and unless the Fourth Amendment is to be completely emasculated this statement will stand alone, uncited, and, hopefully, forgotten.
Furthermore, it is apparent that the problems which the majority feared might present themselves had the police officer searched the automobile at the parking lot posed no threat when the search was made. Officer Conkright testified that the defendant, following the police cruiser, drove the automobile 20 blocks to the police station and that upon arrival there the automobile was parked in the police garage. Some time after that, upon receipt of information that the typewriter was stolen, the automobile was searched.
On this record the warrantless search of the automobile was inexcusable. Until receipt of the information that the typewriter was stolen there was no probable cause for either an arrest or a search. In fact, Officer Conkright testified that defendant was arrested “when we found out that [the typewriter] was stolen merchandise.” At that point there was no reason whatsoever, so far as this record shows, for failure to seek a warrant to search the automobile already in police custody.
As the Supreme Court stated in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, “The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.”
The appellate court correctly held that the evidence obtained from defendant’s automobile should have been suppressed, and its judgment should be affirmed.