(dissenting, with whom Lynch, J., joins). I dissent. In United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the United States Supreme Court permitted a warrantless search and seizure of weapons from a pawnshop operator who was licensed under Federal law to deal in sporting weapons. The Court ruled that inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act of 1968 pose only limited threats to the dealer’s justifiable expectation of privacy. United States v. Biswell, supra at 316. The Court in Biswell relied in part, at least, on the premise that “inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme” of the business of selling weapons. Id. at 315. It is no less crucial in the business of selling controlled substances.
Unannounced inspections in a pervasively regulated industry serve a healthy purpose. The pharmaceutical industry is pervasively regulated. See United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532, 537 (8th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3575 (January 19, 1982); United States v. Schiffman, 572 F.2d 1137,1142 (5th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682, 684 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); United States v. Montrom, 345 F.Supp. 1337, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff’d without opinion, 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973); Hosto v. Brickell, 265 Ark. 147, 153 (1979); People v. Curco Drugs, Inc., 76 Misc. 2d *388222 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. 1973); Poindexter v. State, 545 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
The Court in Biswell said: “[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible.” Biswell, supra at 316. For reasons not dissimilar to those articulated in Biswell, the Court in Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981), sanctioned warrantless searches by Federal mine inspectors acting under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (Supp. III 1979).
The court today complains that G. L. c. 13, § 25, “places virtually no limitations on the time and scope of inspections.” While the authorization contained in § 25 is broad, I think that read in the context of the over-all statutory scheme for the administrative inspection of pharmacies, the legislative scheme meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. First, as to limitations on the places to be inspected, § 25 is explicit; only “places of business” where drugs “are sold or distributed” may be inspected. Second, § 25 limits the authority of the inspector to reporting violations of “the laws relating to pharmacy” and of “the rules and regulations of the board.” I read these references as importing into § 25 the limitations on time, place, and scope of inspection stated explicitly in G. L. c. 94C, § 30. These standards are entirely sufficient to guide the board’s inspectors, as well as the courts, in evaluating the reasonableness of any particular inspection. In this case, the audit performed by LaBelle was clearly within the limitations cited above. I further note the absence of any indication that § 25 has ever been used as a pretext to justify searches going beyond statutory or constitutional limits. To require more explicit limitations in § 25 would indeed be to “overread” the Court’s holding in Biswell. The statute here at issue, G. L. c. 13, § 25, cannot fairly be read as “so seriously *389deficient as to render unconstitutional this non-forcible inspection . . . during business hours, by a narcotics agent, of records of a licensed pharmacist, maintained on the premises as required, relating to narcotics and stimulant or depressant drugs.” United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, supra at 685. See People v. Curco Drugs, Inc., 76 Misc. 2d 222, 231-232 (Crim. Ct. N. Y. 1973).
As a practical matter, the warrant procedure established by G. L. c. 94C, § 30, retains its vitality as an essential component of the statutory scheme for enforcing the laws relating to controlled substances. This is particularly evident since G. L. c. 13, § 25, authorizes inspection, but makes no mention of seizure. Because the Legislature “selected a standard that does not include [seizure],” inspectors must obtain valid warrants under G. L. c. 94C, § 30, before evidence may be seized from controlled premises. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). In the instant case, LaBelle’s audit was well within the limits established by G. L. c. 13, § 25. Therefore, his testimony concerning his observations should be admissible against the defendant in any criminal proceedings based on these indictments.