Appellant Anna Marie Showley (Wife) appeals the judgment of the trial court pertaining to the division of the marital property in her dissolution action against Appellee Eddie G. Showley (Husband). She argues the trial court abused its discretion in its division of the marital property in that the trial court:
1. failed to apprise itself of (a) the contribution of the respective parties to the acquisition of the marital property, (b) the value of the marital property and (c) the economic circumstances of the parties, and
2. failed to report the evidence.
We affirm.
1
Wife argues the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property because it did not follow the mandate of T.C. 31-1-11.5-11(b) (Burns Code Ed., Supp. 1982) to distribute the property in a just and reasonable manner.
*1231A.
In part, this argument is based upon her claim the trial court failed to apprise itself of the value of the marital property and the contribution of the respective spouses to its acquisition. Wife contends the trial court was required to sua sponte fill the evidentiary void when the parties failed to introduce evidence of value and contribution. We rejected this argument in In re Marriage of Church, (1981) Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 1078.
B.
Wife further claims the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property because it failed to consider the economic cireumstances of the parties at the time the disposition of the property was to be effective because (1) there was no evidence of the economic circumstances and (2) the lapse of time between the trial on the merits and the judgment.
Wife's first contention is meritless. The settled record reveals evidence was submitted on the economic circumstances of the parties: assets, debts, employment, income and wife's desire to retain possession of the home.
Wife's second contention is also without merit. The dissolution hearing was held December 3, 1980. However, pursuant to I.C. 81-1-11.5-8 (Burns Code Ed., Supp. 1982) the trial court continued the matter for the parties to seek reconciliation through counseling. On June 15, 1981 Husband filed a petition requesting the trial court to enter a decree of dissolution.1 Then on November 16, 1981, Wife, by petition, sought and obtained a forty-five (45) day stay of ruling on the dissolution. On February 10, 1982, after the expiration of the stay, Husband filed a petition for the trial court to enter a decree. Thereafter, on February 12, 1982 the decree was entered.
Wife argues the evidence submitted to thé trial court on economic cireumstances at the December 8, 1980 hearing would not satisfy the trial court's obligation to consider the circumstances at the "time the disposition of the property is to become effective", I.C. 31-1-11.5-11(b)(8) which was February 12, 1982, the date of the dissolution decree. 'There is no error.
Of necessity, evidence as to the parties' economic circumstances must be submitted at the time of the final hearing even if the evidence is prospective in that a party reasonably anticipates a change of economic circumstances. We realize evidence often will not be available or will be inadmissible because it is speculative in nature. In any event, if for any reason the entry of the decree is delayed, it is reasonable to impose the obligation upon the parties to seek the opportunity to submit additional evidence on a change in circumstances occurring during the delay. Here, Wife did not in any manner advise the trial court of her desire to submit additional evidence based upon an alleged change in economic circumstances that she may believe occurred during the pendency of the action after the date of the final hearing. She cannot now complain.2
IL
Wife asserts the trial court "abused its discretion" by failing to have the December 3, 1980 hearing reported. Again, we disagree. Unquestionably, any party has the absolute right to have any evidentiary proceeding reported. However, it is a right that at times may not be self-executing but may need to be invoked by request. Our combined experience is that there are certain matters which by custom are not reported as a matter of course in our trial courts. Dissolutions frequently fall within this category when only limited issues are in dispute.
*1232The necessity of a demand is not in issue here, however. Rather, the trial court asked each party if a record of the hearing was being requested whereupon each party waived the reporting of the evidence.3 The trial court did not abuse its discretion, if indeed it has any, in not reporting the evidence.
Judgment affirmed.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs. BUCHANAN, C.J., dissents, with separate opinion., 1C. 31-1-11.5-8 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1982) provides the action shall be dismissed after the expiration of ninety (90) days from the date of the continuance. - However, neither party raised this issue.
. Wife further fails to assert the existence of any evidence of any change in the parties' economic circumstances in her Appellant's Brief.
. The settled record includes the following:
"1. - At the commencement of the trial held in this matter on December 3, 1980, the Trial Judge asked each party whether or not they were requesting that the evidence be recorded at which time each party waived the recording of the evidence."
Record (Settled) at 20D (Husband's Exhibit A), 49.