dissenting.
Implicit in the majority's opinion is the assumption that because the Lis Pendens *1091Act of 1877 pre-dated passage of the Eminent Domain Act of 1905, the provision of the latter, which stated that the filing of the condemnation complaint constituted notice to all subsequent purchasers and other interest holders, created an exception to the notice requirements of the Lis Pendens Act. I disagree.
The power of eminent domain has been governed by statute since territorial days. See Louis L. Hegyi, Note, Eminent Domain in Indiana: 1816-1865, 54 Ind. L.J. 427 (1979). Therefore it cannot be reliably said that the silence of the 1905 Act concerning lis pendens notice constitutes an exception to the provisions of the 1877 Act. Seemingly to the contrary, it is more likely that passage of the 1877 Act was intended to reinforce and strengthen the protection afforded to good faith subsequent acquires by putting them on notice of pending litigation concerning the real estate in question. This of course would include condemnation litigation pursuant to 19th century statutes, e.g., condemnation for railroad, canal, and turnpike purposes and other internal improvements by the State. See Act of January 27, 1836, Ch. 2, 1885-36, Ind. Gen Laws 6. Accordingly, I would harmonize the reading of the two Acts by holding that the 1905 Eminent Domain Act must be read to include the filing of a lis pendens notice in order to cut off the interests of subsequent good faith acquires.
I would furthermore note that the mere filing of a condemnation complaint does not necessarily lead to an appropriation order as to the real estate in question. The condemning authority might decide to utilize a different location or route for its proposed project and dismiss the pending eminent domain suit. For this reason, the mere filing of the complaint does little more than to make prospective interest acquires aware of a possibility that the landowner's title may be adversely affected. As the majority notes, a requirement that the condemmnor file a lis pendens notice is without undue burden to the condemning authority (at 1082) and is a worthwhile protection against "a greater mischief that would arise by people's purchasing a right under litigation...." Green et al. v. White, 7 Blackford 242, 244 (Ind.1844).5
Whether dicta or not, I would heed the messages conveyed by the decisions in Cleveland, Cincinnati Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beck, 84 Ind.App. 380, 139 N.E. 705 (1923), State v. Cox, 177 Ind.App. 47, 377 N.E.2d 1389 (1978), and MDM Investments v. City of Carmel, 740 N.E.2d 929 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Accordingly, I would hold that in order to cut off the rights and interests of good faith subsequent acquires, a condemnor must not only file the complaint but must also file a lis pendens notice.
Accordingly, I would apply the requirement of lis pendens notice not only prospectively but to this case as well and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
. The majority acknowledges the wisdom and validity of a lis pendens requirement in cases such as before us but concludes that such is better left to the enactment of amendatory legislation by the General Assembly. I, however, am of the view that this court may and should do so in the exercise of our duty to reconcile arguably inconsistent statutes and to achieve common sense and order to the process. To be sure, I also am of the view that it would be wise for the General Assembly to augment my proposed holding by filling the interstices with legislation.