dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent, finding no authority for the course of action the majority directs.
Most recently in Ogle v. Ogle, 769 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied, we reiterated the "long-standing rule that the non-custodial parent may not unilaterally reduce a child support obligation but must make payments in the manner, amount, and at the times required by an in gross support order until a court orders a modification or all of the children are emancipated or reach the age of twenty-one years." Where the party who was ordered to make child support payments has never petitioned the court to modify or terminate the child support order, the trial court is "without authority to retroactively *288reduce or terminate" that parent's child support obligation. In re Marriage of Loeb, 614 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993); see also Ogle, 769 N.E.2d at 648 (citing Ind.Code § 31-16-16-6, and Beehler v. Beehler, 693 N.E.2d 638, 640 (Ind.Ct. App.1998)).
The majority remands for the trial court to determine whether to grant "relief" to Ronald from the full amount of his child support arrearage and, if so, "the amount of the adjustment to the arrearage." Op. at 286, 287. How would the trial court determine this? Would it base Ronald's court-ordered child support obligation solely upon what is undisputably his imputed weekly income in December of 19957 Would it assume Ronald's income had been at that level during the intervening years, ignoring argument to the trial court that his weekly income was imputed at $300 after Ronald "quit his job at AM General where he was making $45,000 a year" because he "just wanted to take off"? (Tr. 4, 5). Also, the dissolution order directed Ronald to "maintain major medical insurance on the two (2) minor children" through his employment or "share equally" with Julie the expense to "maintain private health insurance" for them. (App. 12). Would the trial court consider the argument of Julie's counsel that Ronald "never maintained health insurance as he was required to do"? (Tr. 6). In other words, for the trial court to now determine what would have been an appropriate level of child support under the cireumstances, does the majority envision a de novo and full evidentiary review of the facts from the time of their divorcee in 1996 to the time of Melissa's emancipation in 20017
Based upon the black-letter prohibition of retroactively modifying child support and the common law of in gross child support orders, I would respectfully disagree with the majority's order that the trial court must somehow revisit the parties' obligations during the period Ronald failed to comply with its order to pay child support. Based upon the facts and circumstances in this case, I agree with the trial court's observation that the parties had "created this problem," that any credit given to Father's arrearage would be "as much arbitrary as equitable," and that this could have been avoided by seeking a modification of the court's order. In essence, I do not find that the trial court abused its discretion, nor was its decision contrary to law.