dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The parties agree that the standard of review of an arbitrator’s contract interpretation is to determine only if the arbitrator’s contract drew its essence from the agreement so as to prevent a manifest disregard of the agreement between the parties. (Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600 (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47.) As noted, the question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the arbitrator. “ Tt is the arbitrator’s construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.’ [Citation.]” 74 Ill. 2d 412, 421, 386 N.E.2d 47, 51.
The Board maintains, and I agree, that the provision of the agreement with respect to registration is clear and unambiguous and specifies three categories of registration duties: (1) counseling; (2) programming; and (3) other professionally related duties. The arbitrator found that librarians are faculty members and therefore, the Board argues, their assignment to programming during registration did not violate the agreement. The Board maintains, and I further agree, that the arbitrator’s finding that registration duties assigned to the librarians were not related to their professional duties varied the agreement to read “Duties of faculty members, other than librarians, during registration period shall consist of counseling, programming and other professionally related duties.” If librarians had been assigned duties other than counseling or programming, then, the Board asserts, a third category of “other professionally related duties” would apply, and a question would be presented whether such other duties were professionally related.
I am persuaded by the Board’s argument that programming during registration is a contractual duty of faculty members and that whether or not it is professionally related is not relevant to this contractual duty. Thus, the arbitrator’s finding that the programming duties assigned to the librarians “were not related to their professional duties” varies the terms of the agreement. The essence of the agreement, in my view, is that there are other undefined professionally related duties aside from programming and counseling which faculty members must perform during registration but that the duties of faculty members, which includes librarians, clearly include programming and counseling. It is undisputed that the librarians at Kennedy-King College did perform programming duties during registration. I believe the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the contract. The award manifestly disregards the agreement between the parties and varies the terms of the agreement.
“[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. * * * [H]is award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.” United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprises Wheel & Car Corp. (1960), 363 U.S. 593, 597,4 L. Ed. 2d 1424, 1428, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 1361.
See also General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 89 v. Hays & Nicoulin, Inc. (6th Cir. 1979), 594 F.2d 1093.
The Union, nevertheless, argues that to interpret the clause, the arbitrator first had to decide whether all assigned registration duties were required to be “professionally related duties.” As noted, the key word in the clause, in the Union’s view, is the adjective “other,” which is used when a comparison of something in the same class is needed but not when a comparison is with things of a different class. The second issue, the Union maintains, is to whom must the registration duties be professionally related and the answer is the faculty member who received the assignment. The Union urges that it established that in no other instance had any faculty members been required to perform registration duties unrelated to their area of specialization. From the record before us on appeal, I am unable to determine that the Union did so establish that fact. The Union also argues that the purpose of the clause was to protect the professional integrity of faculty members and to prevent the use of librarians as clerical assistants to counselors to assist in counseling, a duty which the librarians had no professional competence to perform.
There is nothing in the record before us which describes the librarians registration duties as anything other than programming. Although Grego testified that librarians had no special training or skill to assist with programming, he did not describe the registration duties as clerical in nature. In my view, the plain language of the clause requires faculty members to perform programming and counseling during registration. Librarians admittedly are faculty members, and hence, fall within the class of employees who must perform programming and counseling duties. Consequently, I believe the union’s argument is without merit.
In view of my conclusion that the arbitrator’s award is not drawn from the essence of the agreement, I would find no need to address the other issues raised by the Board. In my view, the arbitrator’s interpretation of the clause varies the terms of the agreement and consequently the arbitrator exceeded his authority under the agreement and the award must be vacated. Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Chicago Transit Authority (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 855, 386 N.E.2d 303; In re American Arbitration Association (1969), 109 Ill. App. 2d 370, 248 N.E.2d 756.
It is my conclusion that the order of the circuit court of Cook County be reversed, the award of the arbitrator be vacated, and judgment for plaintiffs be entered.