¶ 25. concurring. I concur with the majority’s mandate reversing the dismissal of petitioner’s post-conviction-relief (PCR) petition but write to express my belief that this case cannot rationally be distinguished from In re Collette, 2008 VT 136, 185 Vt. 210, 969 A.2d 101, wherein we denied similar relief. In my view, limiting today’s holding to exclude enhanced-sentence cases merely ensures that the commitment we made in State v. Boskind, 174 Vt. 184, 807 A.2d 358 (2002), to provide a nonillusory remedy for defendants challenging enhanced sentences based on allegedly defective predicate convictions will remain unfulfilled.
¶ 26. In Boskind, this Court determined that Vermont’s PCR statute, 13 V.S.A. § 7131, allows defendants to attack “the constitutionality of a prior [previously unchallenged] conviction used to enhance the defendant’s sentence” on a new conviction. 174 Vt. at 185, 807 A.2d at 360. In a dissent joined by Justice Johnson, I agreed that defendants could attack previously unchallenged convictions used to enhance a sentence from a later conviction, but warned that limiting such challenges to PCR actions following the imposition of the enhanced sentence provided only illusory relief because defendants would most likely have served their sentences *261before being able to obtain post-conviction relief. Id. at 193-94, 807 A.2d at 366 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
¶ 27. Unfortunately, my prediction was fulfilled — indeed reinforced — in Collette, where a majority of this Court dismissed a PCR petition filed while the petitioner was still serving an enhanced sentence he claimed was based on an unlawful prior conviction. We held that the petitioner was not entitled to relief because his enhanced sentence had expired before the superior court was able to review his petition. 2008 VT 136, ¶ 1. Thus, in that case, the majority denied petitioner an opportunity to challenge the predicate conviction and consequent enhanced sentence even though he had filed his PCR petition while still serving the enhanced sentence. According to the majority in Collette, no relief was available that could cure any adverse collateral consequences stemming from the predicate convictions because those convictions were unassailable. let. ¶ 13. Once again, I dissented with Justice Johnson joining, pointing out that we had failed to honor our commitment in Boskind to ‘“calibrate a practical remedy’” by administration or rule if it turns out “ ‘defendants are serving all or most of their sentence prior to a PCR determination that the [challenged] predicate convictions used for enhancement are constitutionally infirm.’ ” Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Boskind, 174 Vt. at 192, 807 A.2d at 365).
¶ 28. Recognizing the controlling effect of Collette, the trial court in this case dismissed the PCR petition even though petitioner had filed the petition while he was still in custody. The court ruled that the adverse collateral consequences stemming from the conviction were not sufficient to retain its jurisdiction to address the petition. I agree with the majority’s reversal of this decision, but the trial court was correct in concluding that Collette controls this case. Rather than rely upon a strained, insupportable rationale for distinguishing Collette, we should overrule Collette and enforce our commitment in Boskind.
¶ 29. Because the instant case involves a highly unusual fact pattern, the relief the majority offers under the reasoning employed here will in fact provide no relief in the vast majority of PCR cases. After his motion for a stay of his sentence was denied by the trial court, petitioner sought and obtained a stay pending appeal from this Court. Consequently, following our affirmance of the underlying conviction, petitioner was able to file his PCR petition before his sentence expired. This is not the typical case, *262however. In most cases, the underlying sentence will not be stayed pending appeal and thus relief through PCR proceedings will not be available by the time any appeal of the underlying conviction is resolved. In short, our holding today will provide little relief for most would-be petitioners and will not ameliorate the illusory nature of the relief provided in Boskind.
¶ 30. The majority initially draws what appears to be a firm line that “the expiration of the custodial term will not render the cause moot” with respect to a PCR petition that is filed during the custodial term and that challenges a conviction for which he is still in custody. Ante, ¶ 6. I agree with this general holding and join the majority’s mandate in this case. In my view, however, the majority’s analysis becomes untenable when it attempts to distinguish Collette.
¶ 31. It is important to understand that Collette contains two relevant holdings: the one that the majority attempts to distinguish and the one that makes Collette indistinguishable. The first is, of course, the holding in Collette that the PCR case was moot and had to be dismissed. That is the holding the majority seeks to distinguish. I will return to that holding shortly.
¶ 32. The second holding relates to which conviction the PCR petitioner must challenge, at least initially, to obtain effective relief — the defective predicate conviction or the enhanced sentence conviction which is based on the predicate conviction. Before Collette, PCR petitioners attacked the predicate conviction on the basis that if the attack were successful the predicate conviction would disappear and the petitioner could then move to reopen the enhancement conviction. Under this approach, the petitioner met the PCR requirement of being “in custody under sentence” primarily by serving the enhanced sentence.
¶ 33. That a petitioner could proceed in this way was made explicit in In re Stewart, 140 Vt. 351, 438 A.2d 1106 (1981). Unable to attack in Vermont courts a Colorado conviction and sentence lengthened due to prior Vermont convictions, the petitioner in Stewart instead attacked the underlying Vermont convictions in a PCR proceeding in Vermont. Noting that the petitioner was serving an aggravated Colorado sentence based in part on the prior Vermont convictions, this Court held that petitioner was in custody under sentence for purposes of 13 V.S.A. § 7131 even though the custody was occurring in another state and the *263sentence had been imposed in that state. Id. at 359-60, 438 A.2d at 1109.
¶ 34. Because petitioner could not directly challenge the out-of-state conviction, the Court in Stewart necessarily allowed a collateral challenge to the predicate Vermont convictions even though they had occurred many years earlier and had not been collaterally challenged before expiration of the Vermont sentences imposed from those convictions. In doing so, this Court responded directly to the argument that the convictions were too stale to be challenged. The State argued that petitioner’s attack on the predicate convictions was barred by laches, and this Court rejected that argument. Id. at 360-61, 438 A.2d at 1110. We noted that § 7131 expressly provides that PCR petitions may be filed “at any time” and that this Court had already addressed the merits of PCR petitions attacking convictions that were eighteen and twenty-three years old. Id. at 360, 438 A.2d at 1109. We acknowledged the state’s interest in the finality of criminal convictions, but pointed out that the difficulty in proof over time weighed more heavily on petitioners, who were allocated the burden of proof in PCR petitions, and that post-conviction relief is neither a vehicle for reexamining guilt or innocence nor a substitute for appeal. Id. at 360-61, 438 A.2d at 1109. We concluded that such “safeguards adequately protect the state’s interest in finality.” Id. at 361, 438 A.2d at 1110.
¶ 35. Without so much as a passing reference to Stewart, the Collette majority effectively overruled that case. In Collette, the petitioner filed a PCR petition, claiming that his 2005 conviction for driving while intoxicated, second offense (DUI-2), was the result of a 1992 DUI conviction that had been based on an uncounseled guilty plea without a proper colloquy under Rule 11 of the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure. A majority of this Court concluded that PCR petitioners may seek to overturn enhanced sentences but not the underlying predicate convictions, no matter what their infirmities, because those convictions are final and unassailable upon expiration of their direct sentences. See 2008 VT 136, ¶¶ 5-8. The majority in Collette thus reasoned that post-conviction relief was no longer available to the petitioner once the enhanced sentence expired, even though the petition had been filed before its expiration, because “the challenge here is to the enhanced sentence rather than the fact of petitioner’s long-final prior DUI conviction.” Id. ¶ 17.
*264¶ 36. The effect of this holding in Collette is that there is no relevant difference between an enhancement conviction and the conviction in the instant case for purposes of mootness. To judge that, we should compare what would happen to petitioner in this case if he prevails on his PCR petition with what would have happened to the petitioner in Collette if he had been allowed to go forward and then prevailed. In this case, a conclusion that petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in the underlying criminal case would result in striking that conviction, subject to the State’s right to retry petitioner. Petitioner’s victory would have no effect on his punishment, of course, because he has already served his sentence.
¶ 37. If the petitioner in Collette had been allowed to proceed and then prevailed, the conviction for DUI-2 would have been struck. The State could not have retried the petitioner in Collette for DUI-2 because of the deficiency in the predicate offense and the Collette holding that the predicate offense could not be overturned. He would still have been found guilty of DUI-1, but the punishment for this offense is less in multiple ways than the punishment for DUI-2. Most importantly, if the petitioner in Collette had instead been convicted of DUI-1 and then later was charged with a new DUI, he would have faced a significantly less severe penalty for DUI-2 than if charged with DUI-3. Compare 23 Y.S.A. § 1210(c) (providing that person convicted of DUI-2 is subject to two years in prison and $1500 fine) with id. § 1210(d) (providing that person convicted of DUI-3 is subject to 5 years in prison and $2500 fine).
¶ 38. I recognize that allowing a PCR petitioner to proceed when there is an enhancement conviction as compared to a conviction without enhancement could have differing results, but those differences have nothing to do with mootness. The argument for allowing a petitioner in the Collette petitioner’s circumstances to proceed is as strong, if not stronger, than any argument for allowing the petitioner in this case to proceed. Indeed, I would say it is stronger because the petitioner in Collette would have faced the risk of a further enhanced punishment under the statutory scheme at a later time. As I noted in my dissent in Collette, petitioners in such a position are potentially placed on a treadmill that prevents them from ever challenging enhancement charges before mootness occurs. Id. ¶ 29 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
¶ 39. The salient point on the issue of mootness is that, notwithstanding the majority’s attempt to distinguish Collette, *265both the petitioner in Collette and the instant petitioner are challenging convictions “while still in custody for that challenged conviction.” Ante, ¶ 6. Whatever the theory on which each petitioner hoped to prevail, both of them challenged only one conviction — in Collette the DUI-2 conviction and in this case the impeding-a-public-officer conviction. Just as the petitioner in this case could not raise ineffectiveness of counsel in his criminal trial, the petitioner in Collette was prohibited from raising the invalidity of the predicate conviction as a defense to the DUI-2 charge.6 See Boskind, 174 Vt. at 185, 807 A.2d at 360. (holding that challenges to predicate convictions used for enhancement must be made in PCR proceedings following imposition of enhanced sentence).
¶ 40. The majority suggests that an enhancement conviction can be distinguished from the conviction in this case based on the staleness of the predicate convictions in the enhancement situation. This distinction relies upon language relating to the second Collette holding discussed above as if it is determinative of the mootness holding. The majority’s description of the Collette petitioner as not being “in custody under the challenged conviction” when he filed his PCR petition is not an accurate reflection of that decision.7 Ante, ¶ 11. In fact, the second holding of Collette is that a petitioner may challenge only the enhancement conviction and not the predicate conviction. Thus, the staleness of the predicate *266conviction is irrelevant to the application of mootness because the petitioner in this case is not challenging that conviction except to argue that it cannot be used for enhancement. Ironically, the majority relies on our promise in Boskind to ensure an effective remedy in enforcement cases while at the same time reaffirming a Collette holding that ensures that there will be no remedy, effective or otherwise, in such cases.
¶ 41. As for its mootness ruling, the majority in Collette applied the general principal that a case becomes moot “ ‘when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’ ” Collette, 2008 VT 136, ¶ 4 (quoting State v. Lee, 2007 VT 7, ¶ 10, 181 Vt. 605, 924 A.2d 81 (mem.)). It held that “there was no relief left to be ordered” once the enhanced sentence was completed and nothing could be corrected by court order. Id. The same can be said of this case. Absent an alternative restraint on petitioner’s liberty sufficient to support a PCR claim, this case must be considered moot under our current law because, as in Collette, the sentence for the only conviction that may be challenged has been fully served.8
¶ 42. The majority’s analysis mirrors federal law creating a dichotomy between the legally cognizable injury necessary in habeas cases to exercise jurisdiction as opposed to the injury necessary to withstand mootness claims. Irrespective of whether this dichotomy makes sense, the majority’s rationale is squarely blocked by the Collette decision. As discussed above, Collette disregarded controlling precedent. In addition, it turned post-conviction relief into a remedy available only for felony convictions resulting in lengthy sentences. Hence, the circumstances present grounds for overruling Collette without undermining our adherence to the principle of stare decisis. I would reach the majority’s result via the only true path — overruling Collette.
¶ 43. I am authorized to state that Justice Robinson joins this concurrence.
The petitioner in Collette argued that the predicate conviction could not be used for enhancement for two reasons — petitioner had been denied his right to counsel, and the court had not complied with Rule 11 in taking his guilty plea. See 2008 VT 136, V1. The statement in the text applies to the second ground. Following Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), this Court held in Boskind that defendant could raise in the enhanced sentencing proceeding that the predicate conviction was invalid because of a denial of the right to counsel in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Thus, if Collette had involved only the right-to-eounsel claim, it would be accurate to state that petitioner wanted a second opportunity to make his denial-of-counsel challenge, having failed to do so when it was first available. See 2008 VT 136, ¶ 22 n.3 (noting that although denial-of-counsel claims “may” be raised in enhanced sentencing proceedings, “nothing in Boskind or the federal case law upon which it relied precludes defendants from later raising such claims in PCR proceedings”). By comparison, petitioner never had the opportunity to present his Rule 11 claim, though the Collette majority treated both claims the same in its mootness ruling.
This inaccurate description in ¶ 11 is repeated in ¶¶ 15 and 22. The majority states in the last sentence of ¶ 15 that the Collette court “could not afford the requested relief, thereby rendering his petition moot.” In fact, the court in Collette could have “afford[ed] the requested relief,” as here, by allowing the case to go forward and strike the enhancement if the petitioner prevailed.
We have suggested in the past that restraints on liberty beyond incarceration or supervision by the Department of Corrections could qualify as “custody” under 13 V.S.A. § 7131. See, e.g., Stewart, 140 Vt. at 358, 438 A.2d at 1108-09 (listing various nonincarerative consequences of criminal convictions that may constrain individuals’ liberty sufficient to support claims for post-conviction relief). Given the analysis embraced by the majority, we need not decide today whether, even in the absence of petitioner’s brief period of incarceration, the other legal constraints arising from defendant’s conviction would support a PCR petition.