¶ 17. concurring and dissenting. In 1976, VELCO acquired through the power of eminent domain a 75-foot wide easement on Thomas Farrell’s property for a 115-KV electrical transmission line pursuant to a certificate of public good for the so-called Queen City Tap Line project. The order of condemnation by the Public Service Board incorporated a finding that the property “to be condemned ... to build the Queen City Tap Line is sought and necessary in order that [VELCO] may render adequate service to the public.” As compensation for the taking, the Board awarded Farrell $38,500 “allocated entirely to the value *316of the property taken,” finding no “impairment to the value of the remaining property or consequential damages.”
¶ 18. Thirty years later, VELCO was granted a certificate of public good for a new electrical transmission project, the Northwest Reliability Project, and in connection therewith installed a second transmission line of poles and wires on Farrell’s land and replaced the original line, but this time without the payment of any compensation.3 The trial court here found that this was permissible as a matter of law, and a majority of the Court agrees. As explained below, I do not. While I concur that the second parallel arrangement of poles and wires was within the boundaries of the 1976 taking and of like kind to the general purpose of the original taking, this does not resolve the question whether it nevertheless imposes an additional burden for which compensation should be awarded. That remains a question of fact, and should not have been determined on summary judgment. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent on this issue.
¶ 19. To adequately address the damage question it is necessary to briefly consider the purpose and scope of the taking and the majority’s restrictive understanding of the issue. It is the condemnation petition and order that define the property interest to be taken and the public purpose to be served. See 30 V.S.A. § 111(a) (agency must “present a petition to the public service board . . . describing the property or right, and stating why . . . its acquisition is necessary”); Grice v. Vt. Elec. Power Co., 2008 VT 64, ¶¶ 25-26, 184 Vt. 132, 956 A.2d 561 (concluding that access routes to easement condemned for transmission line were adequately described in condemnation order in light of fact that “VELCO’s petition adequately described the easement it sought” and Board’s findings of public necessity showed that access was necessary to “maintain the reliability and safety of the line”).
¶ 20. Indeed, in construing the scope and purpose of a taking most courts routinely look to the petition and condemnation order of the issuing court or public agency. See, e.g., City of Huntsville v. Rowe, 889 So. 2d 553, 558 (Ala. 2004) (“The rights acquired by the terms of the order of condemnation control the scope of the taking.”); Keokuk Junction Ry. v. IES Indus., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 2000) (“The notice of condemnation provided . . . the scope of the easement.”); Hudson v. City of Shawnee, 790 P.2d *317933, 939 (Kan. 1990) (“The property rights taken by the condemnor are to be determined by the language in the petition for eminent domain and the report of the appraisers.”) (citation omitted); General Hosp. Corp. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 672 N.E.2d 521, 525 (Mass. 1996) (“When deciding the scope of an easement taken by eminent domain, we must consider the language of the taking order and the circumstances surrounding the taking.”) (citation omitted).
¶21. In focusing exclusively on the language of the Farrell easement in isolation, the majority here overlooks relevant provisions of the petition and order in which it appears. The petition alleged that VELCO required Farrell’s property “to construct an electric transmission line . . . connecting its proposed” substations in Williston and South Burlington, and further averred that it could not “render service for its customer without construction of this line.” The Board’s resulting order of condemnation specifically incorporated its earlier finding “beyond any doubt that this line is needed immediately in order that [VELCO] may render adequate service to the public.” Indeed, the findings of necessity incorporated within the condemnation order refer repeatedly to the “projected line,” the proposed “transmission line,” and “the proposed site of this line,” leaving little doubt that the Board contemplated the installation of a single line of poles and wires to accomplish the project.
. ¶22. In concluding otherwise, the majority relies on a single phrase within the lengthy easement language granting VELCO the right to cut, trim, or remove trees that may interfere with the operation of “said line or lines now or hereafter to be constructed on said right of way strip.” Nowhere else does the petition or condemnation order suggest that VELCO contemplated the construction of two or more parallel rows of poles and wires within the easement for the Queen City Tap Line or any other power project. It is more reasonable, therefore, to interpret the reference to “lines” as simply a means of addressing the possibility that the power line may need to be replaced in the future or that additional wires may be added to the existing poles. Even if this were not the case, however, it would suggest at most an ambiguity in the meaning of the condemnation order inconsistent with the granting of summary judgment.
¶ 23. The purpose of a taking necessarily defines its scope, and that purpose — as noted — cannot be understood solely by *318looking at easement language in isolation. See Howard v. United States, 964 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ind. 2012) (“[T]he purpose for which the property is acquired, either through proscription or condemnation, determines the scope of the easement, and the holder of the easement cannot impose a different or extra burden upon the landowner.”) (citation omitted). Viewed in context, it is plain that the Farrell easement was taken specifically to accommodate “an electric transmission line” for a discrete power project, and it is equally plain that the compensation award reflected the limited nature of that objective. As one might expect of a single row of poles and wires running down the center of 75-foot wide easement, the award was solely for the value of “the property taken” rather than for “any impairment td the value of the remaining property or consequential damages.” Obviously, no consideration was given to the possibility of a second row of poles and attached wires to accommodate another ambitious power project some thirty years later or to the impact that a second power line within the same corridor might have on the remaining property.
¶ 24. Where — as here — a new use is consistent with the general nature of an existing easement, the burdened estate may nevertheless be entitled to compensation if it is more onerous than originally contemplated. See, e.g., Minot v. United States, 546 F.2d 378, 381 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (recognizing that, where local power agency installed higher and wider transmission towers in place of existing line within easement owned by United States, power agency could be “held to account for an inverse condemnation” in overburdening plaintiffs’ property, although there was no basis for holding United States liable); Grimes v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 96 S.E.2d 713, 714 (N.C. 1957) (holding that placement of additional lines and cross-arms on existing power poles by second power company imposed additional burden on easement entitling landowner to compensation); City of Sweetwater v. McEntyre, 232 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex Civ. App. 1950) (holding that, although landowner was previously compensated for street construction, “[t]he lowering of the [street] grade imposed an additional burden upon [landowner’s] property from that contemplated when the street was dedicated for which she is entitled to compensation”); see generally 3 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 9.04[2][f], at 9-91 (2006) (“If the use is more onerous, the owner is entitled to recover compensation for the increase in the burden only.”) and § 9.02[ll][c], at 9-45-9-46 (noting distinction between *319cases involving uses that impose additional servitude and those “requiring compensation for damage to property, when the damage claimed arises out of a new or increased use of an existing easement”).
¶ 25. Farrell should be permitted to demonstrate any direct or consequential damages to his property resulting from the additional line not encompassed within the previous condemnation award. Indeed, Farrell alleged that the distinct array of the additional poles and wires, their greater height, and the closer proximity of the two lines of poles to his remaining property resulted in a diminution of the value of the remaining property not contemplated by the original taking. The majority avers that Farrell “produced no evidence” of additional burden and consequently “has not shown” that the additional line “requir[ed] further compensation.” Ante, ¶ 15. The parties here deferred discovery, however, pending a decision on VELCO’s summary judgment claim that the additional line was authorized by the original condemnation order. The trial court, having determined that the original condemnation order did authorize the additional line, “also conclude[d] that VELCO’s use of the easement does not amount to an overburdening.” Nevertheless, as noted, the fact that a power line falls within the general purpose of the easement does not bar Farrell from showing that the installation of a second line imposed an additional burden entitling him to compensation. Accordingly, I would reverse the summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings on this issue.
¶ 26. I am- authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins this concurrence and dissent.
Plaintiff David Farrell is Thomas Farrell’s successor in interest.