¶ 38. concurring. I should probably save my breath to cool my porridge, but speak I must. I am concerned that, as written, applied, and discussed in the majority opinion, the Court’s rule of public access to search warrant materials does not appropriately identify the public interest. When this Court issued a stay of the trial court’s order denying the State’s motion to seal the search warrant documents and pleadings, we noted that the matter involved circumstances not present in In re Sealed Documents, 172 Vt. 152, 772 A.2d 518 (2001) — circumstances “that militate[d] in favor of a more cautionary approach to releasing the search warrant documents.” In re Search Warrants, 2011 VT 88, ¶ 2, 190 Vt. 572, 27 A.2d 345 (mem.). In Sealed Documents, the victims of the crime were deceased and the suspects in custody. By contrast, in this case, the putative victims were missing and no suspects were in custody. We wrote: “Under these circumstances, both the State and the public have a heightened interest in not undermining the criminal investigation through the revelation of facts not generally known to the public.” Search Warrants, 2011 VT 88, ¶2.
¶ 34. This thought echoed the decision in Caledonian-Record Publishing Co. v. Walton, wherein we wrote: “[T]he state has significant interests in protecting the public from criminal activity, prosecuting those who commit crimes, and protecting the privacy rights of individual citizens. These interests may, at times, override the interest in public disclosure.” 154 Vt. 15, 21, 573 A.2d 296, 300 (1990). I suggest that when there is an open or ongoing criminal investigation that could be impaired by allowing public access to investigation materials, a court should consider the state of the investigation when balancing the competing concerns and should recognize and consider the Legislature’s specific pronouncement that “records dealing with the detection and investigation of crime” are exempted from public inspection and copying. 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(5). After all, in the Reporter’s Notes to Rule 1 for Public Access to Court Records (PACR Rule) is written:
*579These rules are intended to be comprehensive, reflecting all existing statutory and procedural rule provisions on public access to court records .... Where an existing procedural rule or statute establishes the law on public access to a particular record, these rules adopt it by reference so these rules are a complete inventory of access law, whatever its source.
¶ 35. A search warrant will not issue until a judge has reviewed the request by law enforcement for a warrant and probable cause has been found. It is this requirement that makes the material, documents, and/or affidavits submitted with the request to issue a warrant into a court record. Thus, in this matter, PACR Rule 6(b)(15) exempts from public access “[rjecords of the issuance of a search warrant, until the date of the return of the warrant, unless sealed by order of the court.” In this matter we are to decide whether the State made the showing required to seal such records. My problem is with Rule 6(b)(15) and its application.
¶ 36. The warrant requirement exists to ensure that neutral magistrates review applications to invade protected privacy interests of individual citizens. It is not a vehicle for public review of the work of law enforcement. The details of the investigation set forth in the search warrant materials provide a reviewing judge with the information needed to make a determination that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. The materials describe the information available at the time of the applications, and the documents filed with the court upon return of the search warrants describe the search results. In this case, all the documents sought concern an ongoing investigation into the Curriers’ disappearance. The Legislature has determined that the public’s interest is best served by maintaining the confidentiality of the details of this investigation.
¶ 37. Here, the lower court did not view the State’s request from the perspective of the legislation governing access to public records. Why? Probably because of-a general understanding that Vermont’s Access to Public Records Act does not govern judicial materials.13 In State v. Tallman, this Court had occasion to decide when affidavits of probable cause, filed in connection with the *580charging information, became public documents. 148 Vt. 465, 537 A.2d 422 (1987). We explained that, prior to inspection by a court, affidavits of probable cause were agency records maintained or compiled in the course of a criminal investigation by police and, as such, were specifically excluded from the definition of a public record. After the affidavit was reviewed by a court, access to the document was then governed by 4 V.S.A. § 693, the statute that administered public access to “records of the court.” Id. at 472, 537 A.2d at 426. That transformation into a court record continues under the Court’s PACR Rules and brings me to the doctrine of separation of powers — what distinguishes and distances 1 VS.A. § 314 from the PACR Rules, specifically Rule 6(b)(15).
¶ 38. Basically, the doctrine of separation of powers decrees that no branch of government should step on the toes of another. It is one of the primary tenets of American law, established by both the United States and Vermont Constitutions. U.S. Const, arts. I-III; Vt. Const, ch. II, § 5. The doctrine posits that “[t]he Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the others.” Vt. Const, ch. II, § 5. See Chioffi v. Winooski Zoning Bd., 151 Vt. 9, 11, 556 A.2d 103, 105 (1989) (separation of powers is “fundamental principle of our form of government”). However, “[a]n absolute separation of government functions among the coequal branches ... is not required or even desirable to achieve the Constitution’s ultimate goal of effective and efficient government.” State v. Pierce, 163 Vt. 192, 195, 657 A.2d 192, 194 (1995). Indeed, powers exercised by different branches of government often overlap by necessity, such as when public regulatory boards or commissions exercise regulatory authority granted to them by the Legislature and simultaneously act in a quasi-judicial capacity by adjudicating disputes. See Trybulski v. Bellows Falls Hydro-Elec. Corp., 112 Vt. 1, 6-7, 20 A.2d 117, 119-20 (1941) (certain amount of overlapping of powers is inevitable).
¶ 39. Along with this occasional overlapping of powers and duties comes a necessary respect and deference for the policies of the other branches. We construe statutes, for example, to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, State v. Ben-Mont Corp., *581163 Vt. 53, 57, 652 A.2d 1004, 1007 (1994), and we are “traditionally reluctant to substitute our judgment for the experience and expertise of an agency.” Lemieux v. Tri-State Lotto Comm’n, 164 Vt. 110, 112, 666 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1995).
¶ 40. With these principles in mind, I suggest that a court deciding a motion to seal material submitted in support of an application for a search warrant should not be unimpressed by the clear legislative expression of public interest found in 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(5). The Legislature’s exemption of records dealing with the investigation of a crime from public inspection serves as an unambiguous statement of the public interest in promoting effective law enforcement. Of course, I do not suggest that it is the court’s role to promote effective law enforcement through its rules. I do suggest that a court, finding itself in possession of a record deemed confidential by the Legislature, should place some value on that statement of public interest — especially since the Reporter’s Notes say the PACR Rules adopt by reference any statute that “establishes the law on public access to a particular record.” Reporter’s Notes, V.R.P.A.C.R. 1. Yes, I know that PACR Rule 6(b)(15) makes no distinction between warrants issued in ongoing investigations and those that occur after an arrest has been made, but it should. In the name of comity and common sense, I would expand the rule to take into consideration the status of the investigation as a factor to consider when a court is asked to seal the documents supporting a search warrant.
¶ 41. The court below reasoned that “[t]he public has a right to information about the police investigation that is filed with the court, and that access can not cause interference with a completed search.” This overly simplistic thought process ignores the fact, as all concede, that the investigation into the disappearance of the Curriers was ongoing. Any one of the searches permitted by the warrants may have been completed, but the investigation was not. I believe the majority opinion appropriately recognizes the substantial threat to the interests of effective law enforcement made in the State’s motion to seal, especially when one considers the conundrum faced by law enforcement in attempting to reveal enough information to justify sealing while still avoiding a back door release of the information sought to be withheld.
In a footnote in a case from 1988 we opined, “It is doubtful that the public records law applies at all to judicial records in view of the specific statutes in the trial courts and the power of the judicial branch over its records.” Herald, Ass’n *580v. Judicial Conduct Bd., 149 Vt. 288, 241 n.7, 544 A.2d 596, 601 n.7 (1988) (citations omitted).