(dissenting). I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority’s holding that statements made by an employer on a Form U-5 are part of a quasi-judicial process and that the public interest is best served by affording the statements an absolute privilege. Rather, I would answer the certified question by stating that such statements are protected by a qualified privilege.
As a matter of public policy, an absolute privilege has been afforded in very few situations (see Park Knoll Assoc. v Schmidt, 59 NY2d 205 [1983]; see also Clark v McGee, 49 NY2d 613 [1980]). These situations have historically involved individuals participating in a public function, including judicial, legislative, *369or executive proceedings (see Toker v Pollak, 44 NY2d 211 [1978]). For example, in Wiener v Weintraub (22 NY2d 330 [1968]), we extended an absolute privilege to individuals who filed complaints to the Grievance Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. In affording such a privilege, we noted that complaints alleging professional misconduct by an attorney had once been presented to Supreme Court, but were now filed with the Grievance Committee of a bar association. By investigating such complaints and conducting disciplinary hearings, the bar association’s Grievance Committee acted as a quasi-judicial body and “an arm of the Appellate Division” (id. at 332).
Unlike the complaints in Wiener, statements made on a Form U-5 are not intended to be part of any court proceeding nor are they presented to a committee having attributes similar to a court. Rather, they are filed by an employer for the primary purpose of notifying the National Association of Securities Dealers’ (NASD) Central Registration Depository system of a change in an employee’s registration status.1 While the information on a Form U-5 could possibly trigger an investigation or even serve as evidence in a later disciplinary proceeding,2 the vast majority of the Forms, being merely informational, do not result in action on the part of any regulatory agency. There is no requirement that the NASD or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) take disciplinary action with respect to the information contained on a Form U-5. Indeed, in this case, there was no action taken by any agency that would provide Mr. Rosenberg with an opportunity to challenge the statements made on his Form U-5.3 Thus, the majority’s holding provides an absolute *370privilege to statements made on a Form U-5 where no judicial or even “quasi-judicial” proceeding is even contemplated. The submission of the Form simply does not represent a preliminary or investigative stage in any quasi-judicial process.
Nor does public policy require that statements made by employers on a Form U-5 be free from liability in a defamation action. When a defamatory statement is made on such a Form, there is the danger of substantial harm to the individual about whom the statement is made. Unlike statements made in a complaint to a grievance committee that are confidential,4 the Form U-5 is widely disseminated. Indeed, potential employers in the securities industry are required to review an individual’s Form U-5 during the hiring process (see NASD rule 3010 [e]). As a consequence, defamatory Form U-5 reporting can unfairly penalize a departing employee and prevent that employee from obtaining new employment or retaining existing customers. “[I]t is widely acknowledged that false Form U-5 reporting has sometimes been used to retaliate against departing employees or threatened to gain concessions from such employees” (Wright, Form U-5 Defamation, 52 Wash & Lee L Rev 1299, 1302 [1995]; see Baravati v Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F3d 704, 708 [7th Cir 1994] [“To insulate the (NASD) members from liability for the contents of their U-5s would be tantamount to allowing a member of the NASD to blackball a former employee from employment throughout the large sector of the industry that the membership of the association constitutes”]). Because of the serious personal and financial interests of the employee at stake, member firms should not be completely immune from all liability for defamatory Form U-5 statements.
The majority focuses on the fact that accurate and forthright responses on the Form U-5 are critical to the financial industry. However, it should be remembered that not only is truth a complete defense to a defamation claim (see Brian v Richardson, 87 NY2d 46 [1995]), but a qualified privilege offers strong protection as well. To overcome a qualified privilege, the employee would have the burden of showing that a statement is actionable because it was motivated by malice (see Toker, 44 *371NY2d at 219; Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429 [1992]). Therefore, truthful and accurate statements on a Form U-5 would not give rise to defamation liability concerns.
Finally, affording statements made on a Form U-5 a qualified, rather than absolute, privilege would provide New York employees in the securities industry the same protections and rights afforded to brokers in other states and create a uniform standard to be applied (see e.g. Dawson v New York Life Ins. Co., 135 F3d 1158 [7th Cir 1998] [applying Illinois law]; Glennon v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 83 F3d 132 [6th Cir 1996] [applying Tennessee law]; Eaton Vance Distribs., Inc. v Ulrich, 692 So 2d 915 [Fla Dist Ct App 1997]).
Because the Form U-5 is not a part of any judicial process, and given the serious potential damage to an employee’s reputation and business prospects, any communication associated with the Form is amply protected by a qualified rather than an absolute privilege.
Judges Ciparick, Read and Jones concur with Judge Graffeo; Judge Pigott dissents and votes to answer the certified question by stating that such statements are protected by a qualified privilege, in a separate opinion in which Judge Smith concurs; Chief Judge Kaye taking no part.
Following certification of a question by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and acceptance of the question by this Court pursuant to section 500.27 of the Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.27), and after hearing argument by counsel for the parties and consideration of the briefs and the record submitted, certified question answered as follows: Statements made by an employer on a NASD employee termination notice are subject to an absolute privilege in a suit for defamation.
. The filing of a Form U-5 is unlike a complaint issued pursuant to the NASD Code of Procedure (rule 9000 series), which governs proceedings for disciplining a member or person associated with a member (see NASD rule 9211 [a]). A “disciplinary proceeding shall begin when the complaint is served and filed” (see rule 9211 [b]).
. As the majority points out, one of the responsibilities of the NASD is to investigate and adjudicate suspected violations of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) laws and the NASD’s rules. Although this function could fairly be described as quasi-judicial, the NASD has only a limited immunity from defamation in the context of reporting its findings (see 15 USC §§ 78o-3, 78iii [b] [no liability if reporting made in “good faith”]).
. The fact that Mr. Rosenberg could have commenced an arbitration proceeding or a court action to expunge the alleged defamatory language, as noted by the majority, is only further proof that the Form U-5 is not part of any quasi-judicial process. If the Form U-5 were part of a quasi-judicial process, then an expungement action would be entirely unnecessary. Indeed, *370a costly expungement action is often the only means by which an employee may challenge defamatory statements made on a Form U-5.
. In Wiener, we noted that any risk of prejudice for statements made in a complaint to a grievance committee was completely “eliminated” because such complaints are deemed “private and confidential” (see Wiener, 22 NY2d at 331, quoting Judiciary Law § 90 [10]).