dissenting with separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent. Branch was charged and convicted of failing to register a change in address "as required under 1.C. 11-8-8-11," which is the subsection applying our State's sex offender registry to persons with a "principal residence." (Appellant's App. p. 8). The majority's opinion acknowledges that Branch identified the United Caring Shelter as his "Home Address." (State's Ex. 1). However, Branch never identified United Caring Shelter as his "principal residence." Indeed, there is no place on the form which he used to report for him to designate whether the place he was then staying was a "principal residence," "temporary residence," or just a transitional place because the individual is homeless and has neither a "principal residence," or a "temporary residence," which could be helpful considering the distinction between the reporting requirements acknowledged in the majority opinion. (Appellant's App. pp. 60-61).
Branch stayed at United Caring Shelter for only eleven days. This short stint at United Caring Shelter is not sufficient to prove that it was his "principal residence," and upon review the record I find a lack of sufficient evidence proving that United Caring Shelter was ever his "principal residence." The majority opinion asserts that "Branch effectively concedes [the] point" that United Caring Shelter was his principal residence in his Appellant's Brief. Op. at 1286. To the contrary, Branch unequivocally asserted that he "fell into" what he refers to as the "third category" of reporting requirements for persons without either a "principal residence" or a "temporary residence." (Appellant's Br. pp. 4-5 (citing IC. § 11-8-8-12(c))). Since the charging information did not reference the proper statutory section applying to Branch, I would conclude that his convietion cannot stand. See Addis v. State, 404 N.E.2d 59, 63-64 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) ("To permit a 'conviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process." ").