dissenting:
Although there is a certain pragmatic appeal to the position taken by my brethren in this matter, I do not believe that a plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code supports the result they reach. In this regard, 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) provides:
“(c) In a case under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, a person is not disqualified for employment under this section solely because of such person’s employment by or representation of a creditor, but may not, while employed by the trustee, represent, in connection with the case, a creditor.”
(Emphasis supplied).
In explaining the effect of the compromise worked out in this section, both Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini made the following report:
“Section 327(c) represents a compromise between H.R. 8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment. The provision states that former representation of a creditor, whether secured or unsecured, will not automatically disqualify a person from being employed by a trustee, but if such person is employed by the trustee, the person may no longer represent the creditor in connection with the case.”
124 Cong.Rec. H11091 (Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 Cong. Rec. S17408 (Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (emphasis supplied).
Given the unambiguous language of 11 U.S.C. § 327(c) and of its legislative history, I cannot join my brethren in sanctioning the employment of the Gendel, Raskoff, Shapiro & Quittner firm by the trustee in this case, as long as that firm continues to represent a creditor of the estate. In my judgment, only corrective legislation can properly achieve the practical results sought by the majority.
I would reverse and remand.