dissenting:
My disagreement with my colleagues stems from the holding of this case that, for some reason, a different rule of law applies to non-home-rule units from that which ap- ' plies to home rule units concerning the authority to legislate with regard to the environment. To me, such a holding is not logical. It may be appropriate in many areas to have such divided authority as this opinion creates. However, when dealing with environmental matters, uniformity of regulation throughout the State is essential if the constitutional guarantee to each person of a healthful environment is to be achieved. Ill. Const. 1970, art. XI, sec. 2.
In City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 484, this court announced the rule that units of local government (home rule and non-home-rule) may legislate in the environmental field concurrently with the General Assembly, subject to the minimum standards established by the legislature. In Carlson v. Village of Worth (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 406, in a seriously fragmented opinion, this court overruled at least that part of City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board which related to the authority of non-home-rule units to legislate on environmental matters. In County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co. (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 494, this court affirmed the holding of City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board insofar as it related to the authority of a home rule unit to legislate on environmental matters, but in dicta (the case did not involve a non-home-rule unit) the court held that non-home-rule units did not possess the same authority. The majority opinion in this case now casts in stone this difference between home rule and non-home-rule units, which heretofore found its most persuasive support in the dicta of County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co.
Uniformity is essential in environmental matters, as is recognized in the majority opinion. I have long argued that all units of local government have the authority to legislate in this field, subject to the limitations set out in City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board. A home rule unit's authority to legislate in this area is found in the constitutional provisions relating to home rule units. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 6.) The authority of non-home-rule units to legislate in this field is found in their police powers. In my dissent in Carlson v. Village of Worth, and in my dissent to the supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing in that case, I discussed in detail the statutory source of those powers and the decisions of this court which have held that local governmental units had the authority to legislate in matters affecting the environment, even before home rule units were authorized in this State by the 1970 Constitution. Those cases need not now be rediscussed in this dissent.
There is a need for local regulation and for local policing of environment problems in all units of local government, both home rule and non-home-rule. As noted in my dissent in City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 1, it is nearly impossible for the Environmental Protection Agency and the Pollution Control Board to effectively police and control all environmental problems arising within local municipalities. I can see no logical reason why non-home-rule units should not be permitted to adopt local ordinances and to enforce them locally to the same extent as home rule units are authorized to do. I would therefore adhere to the holding of City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board.
JUSTICE SIMON joins in this dissent.