(concurring). I would affirm the deci*81sion of the Court of Appeals, albeit for reasons other than those articulated by that Court. The majority analyzes the intent of the Legislature both in enacting the original version of MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401) and in amending that statute, inter alia, to add subsection 4. Bkickley, C.J., ante at 64-65. From this analysis, the majority concludes that the statute has an "overarching intent ... to deter people from committing drug-related crimes,” id. at 68, while allowing trial courts some flexibility to depart below the statutory minimum sentences in the unique cases in which "the Legislature’s intent in passing the statute will not be subsumed by the use of what is intended to be an exception to the rule of long mandatory sentences.” Id. at 69. Although I agree with the majority’s analysis of legislative intent, in my view, the statute fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of "substantial and compelling reasons.” The majority approaches the inadequately defined "substantial and compelling reasons” as if the Court has the authority to decide, as a matter of law, which factors should be included or excluded through application of an " 'objective and verifiable’ ” test. Id. at 68. The dissent would resolve the quandary by concluding that an objective and verifiable standard "is unworkable,” Cavanagh, J., post at 100, in favor of broad judicial discretion to subjectively consider all the circumstances that surround the particular offender and the particular offense. Id. at 90. I believe that in lieu of legislative clarification, we could provide guidance to the trial and appellate courts in implementation of the legislative intent by reference to the well-established meaning of "substantial and compelling” and the traditional standards regarding the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion. However, although I do not join in the majority’s approval of People v Shinhol*82ster,1 Brickley, C.J., ante at 78-79, in light of the extensive efforts of the Court of Appeals to provide meaningful guidance in interpreting the statutes at issue, I believe it would be a disservice to that Court, the trial courts, and the bar to dispose of this question in a plurality opinion. Accordingly, I concur with Chief Justice Brickley’s resolution.
i
Recognizing the primary legislative intent of the statute to deter drug crimes through the imposition of long minimum sentences,2 it is evident that the burden rests on the defendant to demonstrate substantial and compelling reasons on the record why a minimum sentence below that required by law is dictated and would not do damage to the law’s overriding purpose. Thus, the presumption is, in all cases, that at least the minimum statutory sentence should be imposed. It is only when a. defendant can demonstrate justifications for a lower minimum sentence that are both substantial and compelling that such a departure is possible.
ii
Initially, it is clear that substantial reasons for departure below the presumptively allowable minimum sentence are not enough to meet the defendant’s burden. Satisfaction of the "substantial evidence test” standard of appellate review, for exam-*83pie, used for review of decisions of administrative agencies, would be inadequate to meet a "substantial and compelling reasons” requirement. Under the substantial evidence test, only "the amount of evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion” is required, In re Payne, 444 Mich 679, 692; 514 NW2d 121 (1994) (opinion of Boyle, J.), despite the possible preponderance of evidence supporting a different conclusion. Id. at 690, n 8, see also Jackson v People, 9 Mich 111, 119 (1860), quoted in Payne at 690. The possibility of a debatable outcome is impermissible under the substantial and compelling evidence standard. The Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the meaning of such terms and to have consciously elevated the burden of proof by the term "compelling.” Thus, unless those reasons also compel the conclusion that a lower minimum sentence should be imposed, the requirements of § 7401(4) have not been met.
Demonstration of the distinction between substantial reasons and compelling reasons can be found in several United States Supreme Court decisions addressing constitutional questions outside the sphere of criminal law.3 In Committee for Public Ed & Religious Liberty v Nyquist, 413 US 756; 93 S Ct 2955; 37 L Ed 2d 948 (1973), the Court concluded that a package of financial aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, *84created through amendment of New York State’s education and tax laws, violated the Establishment Clause. The Court readily admitted that the state had "substantial reasons” for enacting the legislation. Id. at 795. "Few would question most of the legislative findings supporting this statute.” Id. The Court, however, still found that the programs were constitutionally impermissible. In rejecting the state’s argument for preserving a portion of the legislation allowing tax credits to parents of children attending nonpublic schools, the Court concluded that the rationale of case precedent "plainly compels the conclusion that New York’s tax package violates the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 791.
In Hicklin v Orbeck, 437 US 518; 98 S Ct 2482; 57 L Ed 2d 397 (1978), the Court considered the constitutionality, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, of a state statute deemed "Alaska Hire.” Claiming a desire to reduce unemployment, Alaska Hire required a number of categories of oil and gas related agreements to contain clauses requiring employment of qualified Alaska residents, in preference over nonresidents. Citing Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385; 68 S Ct 1156; 92 L Ed 1460 (1948), the Court admitted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not preclude state efforts to "bias employment opportunities in favor of its own residents,” 437 US 525, but noted that such discrimination was only permissible where a "substantial reason” for such action exists, i.e., " 'there is something to indicate that noncitizens constitute a peculiar source of evil at which the [discriminatory] statute is aimed.’ ” Id. at 525-526. The Court held that no appropriately substantial reason existed in Hicklin to justify the state’s action, and, moreover, even if it did, Toomer, inter alia, "compelled] the conclusion that Alaska Hire *85nevertheless fails to pass constitutional muster” because the blanket preference for state residents did not bear a substantial relationship to the avowed purpose of reducing unemployment. Id. at 526-527.
Both • Nyquist and Hicklin demonstrate that while substantial reasons — strong, solid reasons of considerable value — may exist to justify a course of action, those reasons will be inadequate if countervailing, superior considerations are presented that compel a conclusion against such action. In the cases discussed above, those superior considerations were the requirements of the Establishment and Privileges and Immunities Clauses, which forced a conclusion striking down the legislative action in question. Those constitutional precepts are présumptively "compelling” unless arguments for an exception are of such force that they are irrebuttable, being both substantial and compelling. In the present case, the superior consideration that must be met and decisively surmounted is the overarching legislative intent of deterrence of drug crimes. It is to further clarification of the "substantial and compelling reasons” standard of review to which I now turn.
hi
The "substantial and compelling reasons” standard is most familiar in challenges to state action burdening fundamental rights or discriminating against suspect classes. See, e.g., Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330, 335; 92 S Ct 995; 31 L Ed 2d 274 (1972) (striking down durational residence requirements). Under this strict scrutiny standard of review, such state action is impermissible unless it is a necessary means to promote a compelling state interest. Id. at 337.
*86While cases imposing a substantial and compelling reason standard of review where state action impinges on fundamental rights demonstrate the imposing burden such a standard represents, of more apt analogy to the present case is the less restrictive "rational basis” test applied to equal protection claims against state action that implicates no fundamental right or suspect classification. Under both the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests, a similarly high standard of proof is required of a party challenging the presumptively valid position. The rational basis test, however, presumes that the state action is valid. Such a presumption is analogous to the presumption that the minimum sentencing requirements of MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401) advance the valid legislative goal of crime deterrence.
In rational basis review cases, the state need only articulate, not prove, a legitimate state interest advanced by its action. "There is a presumption that the objectives articulated by the ordinance are the ones actually pursued,” and such presumption controls "'unless an examination of the circumstances forces . . . [the conclusion] that they could not have been a goal of the legislature.' " JBK, Inc v City of Kansas City, Mo, 641 F Supp 893, 903 (WD Mo, 1986) (emphasis added), citing Minnesota v Clover Leaf Creamery Co, 449 US 456, 463, n 7; 101 S Ct 715; 66 L Ed 2d 659 (1981).
In JBK, plaintiffs brought a variety of constitutional challenges against an ordinance regulating massage parlors. In holding that the plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection claims did not survive the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court noted that to survive such a motion, the party challenging the legislation must "offer evidence of a substantial *87character (or at least an argument based upon compelling logic) which rebuts the presumption” of constitutional validity. Id. at 904 (emphasis added). The court described the argument that must be advanced by the party opposing the motion to be one that "forces the conclusion” that the goal advanced for the legislation was not an objective actually pursued. Id.
United States Supreme Court cases applying the rational basis test to equal protection challenges clarify what is necessary to constitute "evidence of a substantial character” and an "argument based upon compelling logic” rebutting a presumption upholding state action. "[T]hose challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decision-maker.” Vance v Bradley, 440 US 93, 111; 99 S Ct 939; 59 L Ed 2d 171 (1979) (emphasis added). Parties challenging state action reviewed under the rational basis test must advance an argument precluding debate. Such challenges "cannot prevail so long as 'it is evident from all the considerations presented . . . that the question is at least debatable.’ ” Clover Leaf Creamery Co, supra at 464. "[I]t is the very admission that the facts are arguable that immunizes from constitutional attack” the statute being challenged. Vance, supra at 112.
It is the need for an argument that "forces the conclusion” that the presumptive rule should not be applied that I would find to be at the crux of the "substantial and compelling reasons” of § 4, and makes the rational basis test a valuable tool for understanding this standard. As noted several times, the "overarching intent” of MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401) is "to deter people from committing drug-related crimes.” Like the legitimate state *88interest advanced under a rational basis review, this legislative intent is presumed to be advanced by the imposition of at least the minimum sentences commanded by the statute. It is only when a defendant advances an argument that convinces a court that the legislative intent "could not reasonably be perceived” to be advanced by imposition of the minimum sentence in the case, that "substantial and compelling reasons” for departure from the minimum sentence have been articulated. Thus, as long as it is evident from all the considerations presented that the question of departure from the statutory minimum is debatable, no substantial reasons compelling departure from the minimum should be found. In effect, the burden of proof is to satisfy the sentencing court that in the circumstances presented no reasonable legislative or judicial decisionmaker would impose the mandatory minimum sentence.
iv
The standard described is a difficult but not impregnable barrier to a defendant convicted of a drug offense under MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401). For example, where a defendant substantially assists after arrest in the investigation or prosecution of another defendant, where such cooperation is verified by the proper authorities, departure below the minimum may be in order. See 18 USC 3553(e); USSG § 5K1.1. Imposition of the statutory minimum sentence where the defendant has provided assistance would discourage future cooperation, because other defendants perceive that no benefit can be derived from their action.4 Without such assistance, the task for au*89thorities in continuing to fight drug activity is made more difficult, and aggregate deterrent effect on the continued commission of drug crimes — the fundamental goal of MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401) — is thus retarded by the failure to deviate from the statutory requirements. However, although the Legislature has given the trial courts a stringent standard of discretion, confined in its exercise, it does not follow that other circumstances of a uniquely substantial and compelling character so as to compel deviation below the statutory minimum sentences may not be shown. As the legislative history clearly indicates, ante at 64-65, the Legislature also intended to allow flexibility in individual circumstances. The long and tortured history of judicial efforts to define "substantial and compelling” by reference to some touchstone that does not negate the express legislative preference is a graphic illustration that we are not well served by resort to amorphous terms like "substantial and compelling” without defining what is meant, if only by example. Where a statute prescribes a serious penalty on the one hand, and on the other invites avoidance by judicial construction, the underlying policy decisions have simply been shifted to another forum. In lieu of legislative guidance, I would resort to the standards inherent in any formulation of burden of proof and burden of persuasion. The defendant must come forward with evidence, and it must be sufficient to convince the trial court that no reasonable decisionmaker would impose the minimum sentence ordinarily assessed.
v
In summary, the presumption exists that no lesser minimum sentence than that prescribed by *90the statute should be imposed. Where the defendant advances and proves substantial and compelling reasons that permit the conclusion that no reasonable decisionmaker would impose the statutory minimum, departure is permissible.
Where the imposition of the statutory minimum is debatable or arguable, departure below the minimum is precluded.
196 Mich App 531; 493 NW2d 502 (1992). This is dicta with a vengeance. The question whether defendant’s successive criminal acts not involving police entrapment can amount to a mitigating circumstance is far too significant to be resolved in the context of a record that does not present that question.
An inability to appreciate this fundamental legislative goal permeates the dissenting opinion and fatally flaws the attempt to rationalize a subjective and unlimited discretionary power afforded trial courts for departure below the statutory mandate.
I examine the use of the terms "substantial” and “compelling,” as well as the phrase "substantial and compelling reasons,” in a legal context to aid courts in understanding the proper application of those terms in the present setting. While generally the words of a statute are understood "according to the common and approved usage of the language,” words and phrases "as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1). I do not find the use of the words "substantial” and "compelling” separately as terms of art in the following cases, but I do not discount the possibility of such a reading of the phrase "substantial and compelling reasons.”
Cooperation with police is 'clearly an act fraught with the potential for great risk to the defendant’s personal safety. Providing such assistance may thus be a strong indication of rehabilitative potential.