dissenting:
As the majority indicates, the law of Illinois is that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Generally, in addition to testimony by an accomplice there is evidence that a crime occurred. Here, however, the alleged victim was incapable of complaining of the offense committed against her. Nevertheless, the defendant’s complaint to the police is an admission that an act of intercourse was had with his daughter. In short, the defendant admits that an offense occurred, though he does not admit he was responsible therefor.
I do believe the presence of the alleged victim in the courtroom during the trial was prejudicial to the defendant. Yet, I do not believe this alone warrants an outright reversal, and the cause should be remanded for a new trial absent the prejudicial effect of the appearance of the defendant’s retarded daughter.
The majority suggests that the accomplice’s testimony has too many infirmities to sustain a conviction. Those “infirmities” are that the testimony was uncorroborated, that the accomplice received a lenient sentence, that the accomplice admitted intercourse with the girl, and that he had reason to feel malice toward the defendant because of the defendant’s complaint to the police. Not only are these matters of credibility to be considered by a jury, but the existence of malice is pure speculation on the part of the majority. For the majority to award an outright reversal is an usurpation by the appellate court of the function of the jury. See People v. Wilson (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 346, 362 N.E.2d 291; People v. Spenard (4th Dist. 1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 892, 361 N.E.2d 856.