SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING*
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVANdelivered the opinion of the court:
In its petition for a rehearing of this matter, defendant contends that contrary to the conclusion in our opinion the trial court did accept plaintiffs’ computations without alteration; that although its hypothetical question was stricken, if the mathematical analysis presented in the question is applied by this court to the exhibits admitted into evidence, the merit of its appeal would be established; that the schedule of collections appearing in the text of our opinion is inaccurate in that it failed to consider the contents of exhibits; that if a new schedule were recomputed and then analyzed by this court its appeal would be shown to be meritorious; that its accountant did not testify as stated in our opinion that he treated all funds collected in relation to warrant 264 as a unit; and that this court misapprehended the doctrine of laches.
Initially we point out that plaintiffs were ordered by this court to respond to the petition for rehearing and in doing so tacitly agreed with defendant’s contention that the trial court did accept the calculations of their accountant without alteration. Although the record fails to affirmatively show this to be the case, the litigants’ acceptance of the existence of such circumstance will be taken as an admission. (McKenzie v. Arthur T. McIntosh & Co. (1964), 50 Ill. App. 2d 370, 200 N.E.2d 138.) In the text of our opinion we noted that plaintiffs’ accountant had: (1) failed to deduct taxpayer rebates of *61.29 in installments two through four; (2) included *1,227.96 as the amount which should have been but was not levied and collected in installment six; (3) inadvertently duplicated this error by again adding *1,227.96 to the amounts collected; and (4) treated cancelled bonds totalling *646.86 as a cash collection. Since the inclusion of such amounts expanded defendant’s liability beyond the sums actually collected and because plaintiffs have admitted the court’s use of those figures, we conclude that the judgments entered were based upon an erroneous overstatement of collections in the amount of *3,286.65.
Turning to defendant’s contentions concerning the application of its hypothetical question to the contents of exhibits and the accuracy3 of the schedule contained in the text of our opinion, we initially note that the record presented us includes voluminous and unexcerpted exhibits, hundreds in number, the contents of which are unspecified. In the normal course of events, a litigant who challenges the correctness of the ruling in an accounting case will by means of his brief and abstract or excerpts not only allege the law to be applied to the facts but also isolate the relevant accounting data to which the law must be applied.
Here, defendant argues that but for the erroneous calculations of plaintiffs’ accountant which were relied upon by the trial court, judgment would not have been rendered in favor of plaintiffs. In other words it does not seek a reduction of the amounts awarded plaintiffs but rather judgment in its favor. With the exception of the errors we have set forth above, defendant has made no attempt to isolate the specific data which he claims erroneously contributed to the judgment below. Rather than detailing evidence to support his contention that any judgment in favor of plaintiffs was against the manifest weight of the evidence, it alleges numerous points in a generalized and abstract manner. As the issues have been stated in such fashion (Ambrosius v. Katz (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 173, 117 N.E.2d 69), and as relevant portions of the record necessary to ascertain whether defendant’s allegations of error are meritorious have not been isolated in the briefs or excerpts (First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. 4800 Marine Drive, Inc. (1964), 49 Ill. App. 2d 218, 198 N.E.2d 583 (abstract)), we are unable to say that the judgment of the trial court was erroneous beyond those errors noted above.
Defendant next contends that its expert did not testify as stated in our opinion that in compiling the 1954 payment schedule all funds collected in relation to a particular warrant such as warrant 264 were allotted to the benefit of all bondholders regardless of installment. We have again reviewed the testimony and have found that the expert did so testify.
Lastly defendant contends that we misapprehended the doctrine of laches. Again we disagree as we believe that the law dispositive of this issue was correctly stated in our opinion.
We affirm that portion of the judgment order finding the issues in favor of plaintiffs but, having concluded that warrant 264 collections were overstated by the trial court to the extent of $3,286.65, we will vacate the findings of the trial court as to the amounts due each plaintiff and remand this cause to determine the resulting adjustment and plaintiffs’ pro rata shares plus accrued interest when the above sum is deducted from the amount of collections as previously determined by the trial court.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded for a redetermination of amounts due each plaintiff.
MEJDA and WILSON, JJ., concur.
A second supplemental opinion, filed October 20, 1978, appears at page 1052.
The accuracy of the table is supported by the amounts elicited from defendant’s cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert and direct examination of its own expert.