¶25. Specially Assigned, dissenting. The line between fundamental fairness and unfair indulgence in the *275treatment of self-represented litigants is not always clear. What is clear is this Court’s “promise to protect the rights of pro se litigants,” In re Estate of Knott, 149 Vt. 245, 247, 542 A.2d 297, 298 (1988) (Dooley, J., dissenting), and ensure that their inexperience does not permit “unfair imposition or unconscionable advantage” to be gained at their expense. Vahlteich v. Knott, 139 Vt. 588, 590, 433 A.2d 287, 288 (1981). Was the trial court’s dismissal of neighbors’ appeal technically permissible under the rules? The answer is probably yes. Was its ruling reasonable from the perspective of fairness and consistent with our policy of protecting the rights of those who represent themselves in court? I think the answer is plainly no. Accordingly, for the reasons more fully set forth below, I would reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶26. The material facts are largely undisputed. Neighbors Michael and Jeannette Auger did not receive written notice of applicant Verizon Wireless’s application for a conditional use permit to install a communications tower adjacent to their land in the Town of Barton, as they were entitled by statute, 24 V.S.A. § 4464(a)(1)(C), nor did neighbors appear at the public hearing that resulted in the ZBA’s decision to grant the application on June 5, 2008. Upon learning of the decision, however, neighbors — acting pro se — filed a timely notice of appeal with the Environmental Court on June 30, 2008, and submitted a written statement of questions in late August 2008 listing two main issues: (1) whether the proposed tower would adversely affect their property, and (2) whether the Town adequately considered an existing tower site. About six weeks later, applicant moved to dismiss the appeal, asserting, among other grounds, that neighbors lacked standing to appeal because they were not interested parties who had participated in the municipal proceedings. In anticipation of neighbors’ response that “they did not receive notice” of the hearing, applicant asserted that neighbors failed to preserve the claim by raising it in their statement of questions.
¶27. The following month, neighbors — now represented by counsel — filed an opposition to the motion and an amended statement of questions, asserting, as applicant had anticipated, that they were denied proper notice and opportunity to participate in the ZBA proceeding. Several months later, the trial court issued its ruling, finding that that neighbors were “interested parties” (i.e., they own property adjacent to the affected site) and *276therefore could assert standing to appeal on either of two separate grounds: first, if they had participated in the municipal proceeding, under 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(1), or, alternatively, if they could show that “there was a procedural defect which prevented [them] from . . . participating in the proceeding,” pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2)(A). The trial court found that neighbors failed to meet the first standing requirement by having failed to participate in the ZBA proceeding. The court declined to address the second ground, however, citing neighbors’ failure to comply with an Environmental Court rule requiring that “[a]n appellant who claims party status under 10 Y.S.A. § 8504(b)(2) . . . must assert that claim by motion filed with the notice of appeal.” V.R.E.C.P. 5(d)(2). The trial court concluded that, in the absence of a motion for party status filed contemporaneously with the notice of appeal, it “cannot hear the appeal” and entered a judgment of dismissal. Thus, the court did not address neighbors’ standing under § 8504(b)(2) or the merits of the underlying appeal. The majority would affirm the court’s ruling as within its broad discretion.
¶28. I agree that sound principles of efficient court management — some of which were noted by the trial court here — undoubtedly inform the Environmental Court rule requiring prompt notice of a claim to party status under 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2). Certainly there is a “possibility,” as the trial court observed, that absent such notice the court might “begin to engage its resources in evaluating the substance of a claim” only to discover later that the appellant lacks standing. I would add to the court’s concern the potentially unnecessary expenditure of time and resources by the party opponent and the potential for abuse of the appellate process as a delaying tactic.
¶ 29. Nevertheless, in most cases where a procedural rule requires some action within a specified timeframe, it is within the trial court’s discretion to order the period enlarged. Rule 5(d)(2) of the Environmental Court Rules is no exception. See V.R.C.P. 6(b) (when “an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed ... or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect”); V.R.E.C.P. *2774(a)(2) (providing that the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, with certain exceptions not here applicable, apply to all proceedings in the Environmental Court). Thus, the trial court remained free to permit a late filing of the motion for party status “where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.” V.R.C.P. 6(b).
¶30. The trial court explained that it did not consider this option, however, because neighbors had not formally “requested such permission.” This is the point where, in my view, the court’s reasoning falters, betraying a formalism wholly inappropriate to the circumstances. Neighbors were pro se when they filed their appeal. As adjoining landowners and nonattorneys there is very little likelihood that they were even aware that their standing to appeal was at risk by virtue of their failure to participate in the ZBA proceedings. There is even less chance that they were aware of the Environmental Court rule requiring the filing of a motion for party status simultaneously with the notice of appeal. Indeed, this is a requirement that even seasoned attorneys might miss, as evidenced by the fact that it was not raised in applicant’s otherwise quite thorough motion to dismiss. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that even with the benefit of counsel neighbors had still not moved to enlarge time when the court issued its ruling.
¶ 31. On the other hand, the trial court here was clearly alerted to the issue of neighbors’ party status at least as early as applicant’s motion to dismiss, and was equally aware, from neighbors’ opposition, of their claim that a defective notice had prevented their participation in the municipal hearing — precisely the ground for party status enumerated in 10 V.S.A. § 8504(b)(2). Under the circumstances, it is fair to ask whether the trial court acted reasonably in dismissing neighbors’ appeal because they had not officially noticed their intent to seek party status under § 8504(b)(2) rather than simply informing them of the need for a formal motion or even treating their pleadings as the functional equivalent.
¶ 32. Viewed in light of the purposes underlying the Environmental Court rule and our duty to treat self-represented litigants fairly, I suggest that it was not. The trial court here was certainly right to consider the interests served by the rule, but it was wrong not to assess those interests in light of the circumstances. Applicant moved promptly to dismiss the appeal for lack of standing or subject matter jurisdiction, and the court considered only those issues. Thus, neither the court nor applicant was *278induced to expend any unnecessary time or resources on the underlying merits of the appeal before addressing neighbors’ party status. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that neighbors’ appeal was taken in bad faith or for the purpose of delay. Accordingly, no prejudice to applicant or to the efficient administration of justice would result in this case from addressing neighbors’ claim to party status.
¶ 33. The “duty of the court to treat pro se litigants fairly” is another pertinent consideration. Bingham v. Tenney, 154 Vt. 96, 100, 573 A.2d 1185, 1186 (1990). Although parties who represent themselves are generally not excused from compliance with the ordinary rules of civil procedure, this Court has also recognized that denying a self-represented litigant his or her day in court for an innocent and otherwise harmless procedural error may be unduly harsh. See id. at 100, 573 A.2d at 1187 (applying the “rale of unconscionability” to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in entering summary judgment against a pro se litigant for failure to file an affidavit in opposition to the motion); Vahlteich, 139 Vt. at 591, 433 A.2d at 289 (reversing a default judgment as “unconscionable” where defendant mistakenly believed that his daughter’s appearance and answer was sufficient to defend the action). In the environmental arena, the Legislature has specifically required that Environmental Court rales provide for “expeditious proceedings that give due consideration to the needs of pro se litigants.” 4 V.S.A. § 1001(g)(1) (emphasis added).
¶ 34. The trial court’s ruling here was the functional equivalent of a default judgment for applicant based upon what amounted to a harmless procedural omission. Like the rules governing such judgments, the procedural rules at issue here “should be liberally construed in favor ... of resolving litigation on the merits, to the end that fairness and justice are served.” Desjarlais v. Gilman, 143 Vt. 154, 158-59, 463 A.2d 234, 237 (1983). Even if neighbors had been represented by counsel from the beginning, I see no purpose or reason in the trial court’s decision to dismiss this appeal. Indeed, denying neighbors their day in court when neither applicant nor the trial court was prejudiced by the failure to move for party status defies reason and thus amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Mathieu Enters., Inc. v. Patsy’s Cos., 2009 VT 69, ¶ 10, 186 Vt. 557, 978 A.2d 481 (mem.) (abuse of discretion occurs when that discretion is exercised “on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable, or to an extent clearly unreasonable” (quotation *279omitted)). Therefore, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing neighbors’ appeal and remand for the court to address the standing issue.
¶ 35. I am authorized to state that Judge Crawford joins in this dissent.