(concurring). I concur in the result. In my dissent in Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 523 (1982) (Sheppard I), I concluded that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not mandate suppression of the evidence seized in this case. The Supreme Court agreed, and held that “the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-988 (1984). See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-907 (1984). Even if an exclusionary rule, which has escaped detection for 205 years, is now discovered in art. 14, I see no reason to formulate a different rule for its application in this Commonwealth.
In my dissent in Commonwealth v. Upton, ante 363, 380 (1985), (Upton II), I did not reach the issue whether G. L. c. 276 required the exclusion of evidence seized in the absence of probable cause, because I concluded that probable cause existed. Since I agree that G. L. c. 276 does not require exclusion in the circumstances of this case, I do not reach the issue of when, if ever, a violation of G. L. c. 276 requires the exclusion of evidence.