Geske v. Geske

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN,

dissenting:

The facts relevant to a resolution of this appeal are not in dispute. The plaintiff filed a two-count amended complaint against the defendant asserting claims for unjust enrichment and fraud. The matter proceeded to trial without a jury. At the close of the plaintiffs case in chief, the defendant moved for a directed finding pursuant to section 2 — 1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2— 1110 (West 2000)). The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, the defendant rested without introducing any additional evidence. Following a brief deliberation, the trial judge entered a judgment in favor of the defendant on both counts. The plaintiff appealed, contending that the court’s judgment was inconsistent with its denial of the defendant’s motion for a directed finding. We agreed, reversed the judgment, and remanded the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. Geske v. Geske, No. 1—01—2512 (2000) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (hereinafter referred to as Geske I).

On remand, the trial court sua sponte vacated its order denying the defendant’s motion for a directed finding at the close of the plaintiffs case in chief, granted the motion, and again entered judgment in favor of the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the instant appeal. I would again reverse the trial court’s judgment in this matter.

When this court reverses an order of the circuit court and remands the cause for further proceedings, the circuit court is bound by our determination of all issues decided and may act only in conformity with our judgment. Aardvark Art, Inc. v. Lehigh/Steck-Warlick, 284 Ill. App. 3d 627, 633, 672 N.E.2d 697 (1996). I believe that the procedure employed by the circuit court in this case on remand was inconsistent with the determinations made by this court in Geske I.

In Geske I, we held that “the trial judge erred in finding that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy his required burden of proof and entering a judgment in the defendant’s favor.” As a consequence, we reversed the judgment entered in favor of the defendant and remanded the cause for further proceedings “not inconsistent” with our order. (Emphasis added.) Geske I, No. 1—01—2512. On remand, the trial court vacated its order denying the defendant’s motion for a directed finding at the close of the plaintiffs case in chief, granted the motion, and again entered judgment in favor of the defendant. Implicit in the trial court’s order is a finding that the plaintiff failed, in his case-in-chief, to satisfy his required burden of proof. The finding is obviously inconsistent with our determination of the same issue in Geske I.

When, as in Geske I, this court remands a cause to the circuit court with directions to proceed in a manner not inconsistent with our order, the correctness of the trial court’s action on remand is to be determined by reference to the content of our order. PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 308, 427 N.E.2d 563 (1981). The defendant asserts that the direction we gave in Geske I was “vague.” To be sure, we did not specifically direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff. However, our failure in this regard could in no instance be interpreted as permitting the trial court to enter judgment for the defendant predicated upon a finding wholly inconsistent with a determination that this court had made on the same issue.

When we reversed the trial court’s judgment for the defendant in Geske I and remanded the cause with a direction to conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with our order, I believe that only two options were available to the trial court. It could have entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff or, in the exercise of its discretion, it could have reopened proofs and continued on with the trial. Unfortunately, the trial court chose neither option and instead embarked upon a course of action which I believe was inconsistent with this court’s prior order.

I would reverse the judgment entered in favor of the defendant and remand this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with our order in Geske I. Consequently, I must respectfully dissent.