This case comes to us on transfer from the Appellate Court under Acts 1933, ch. 151, §1, p. 800, being §4-215 (First), Burns’ 1946 Replacement. See: Harness v. Churchmembers Life Insurance Company (1959), 130 Ind. App. 185, 163 N. E. 2d 37 for opinion of the Appellate Court.
This action was brought by the appellant, as natural father of Stephen Harness, a minor, six years of age, against the defendants, and each of them, for the wrongful death of his son.
Appellant’s complaint, in substance, alleged that defendant, Churchmembers Life Insurance Company, was and is a domestic mutual insurance corporation engaged in writing life, health and other insurance; that on the 14th day of December 1951, and prior thereto the defendant corporation was the owner of certain real estate in Marion County, Indiana. Sometime in September 1951, the exact date being unknown to appellant, appellee insurance company began the excavation of a pit for the installation of a septic tank as an incident to the construction of a house on such real estate. The appellee insurance company employed one George F. Kopetsky to make such excavation and installation and hired one Glen Ashmore to supervise all of said construction. On or before November 1, 1951, the defendants and each of them completed the excavation of the pit on such lot for such septic tank. The pit was approximately six feet wide running north and south and twelve feet long running east and west, and *674on its south and west sides large and steep mounds of earth sloped directly into the pit. The pit sat unused from November 1, 1951, until after December 14, 1951, and during such interim water had been allowed and permitted by defendants to accumulate in it to a depth of six feet. The pit was located on such real estate about 125 feet from Fairfax Road and about 125 feet from Keystone Avenue, in a residential district having a large number of children residing in and near the real estate owned by appellant corporation. All during the time of construction, large numbers of children were attracted to and accustomed to playing on said lot and around the pit and mounds of earth on its south and west side. On and prior to December 14, 1951, the pit with its mounds of dirt and accumulated water had frozen, was covered with snow, was an artificial condition not found in nature, was latently and inherently dangerous to children, particularly children of six years of age who did not and could not appreciate such danger on account of their youth, and constituted an attractive nuisance to children.
Appellant further alleges that appellee insurance corporation could have eliminated such dangers by leveling the pit, posting signs, erecting fences or pumping out the water for $10.00 or less, with no loss of the use of said lot or pit and that all of the foregoing facts were known to the appellees and each of them.
Appellant further alleges that on December 14, 1951, about 4:30 P.M. as dusk was falling Stephen Harness left his home approximately 150 yards southeast of the pit and went to the pit to play on the mounds of dirt around it, unaware of the latent dangers of the pit on such date, subsequently while playing on the mounds of dirt around the pit he slid or slipped onto the *675ice in the pit which broke under his weight and he drowned in the water of the pit.
Appellant in rhetorical paragraph eleven of his amended complaint alleges nine specific acts of negligence on the part of appellees, which paagraph reads as follows:
“11. The death of Stephen Harness as herein-before alleged, was directly and proximately caused by the negligent acts of the defendants, and each of them:
“1. Negligently excavating a pit of the size and dimensions of the Pit, and permitting the same to become negligently filled with water.
“2. Negligently permitting said above described Pit to remain filled with water.
“3. Negligently failing to post any signs of warning of the dangers upon said premises.
“4. Negligently failing to post signs forbidding trespassers.
“5. Negligently failing to remove said latent danger, inherent in the Pit as alleged above, or take proper steps to remove same, it being in such a negligent and dangerous condition for approximately six (6) weeks.
“6. Negligently failing to provide a suitable covering for the top of said Pit.
“7. Negligently permitting the mounds of dirt to be placed on certain sides of the Pit with a straight drop-off into the Pit filled with water.
“8. Negligently failing to maintain a fence of [or] other proper means of guarding the Pit.
“9. Negligently failing to warn children of tender ages of the hidden dangers on said premises.”
Appellant further alleges that at the time of his death Stephen Harness was a healthy, intelligent boy, and that the proximate cause of the death of such child was *676due to the negligence of the appellees, and each of them, and that thereby appellant has been deprived of the services and earnings of said child to appellant’s damage in the sum of $20,000.
On the 7th day of September 1956, the appellees, Churchmembers Life Insurance Company and Glen Ash-more, filed the following demurrer to appellant’s amended complaint, which omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:
“Come now the defendants Churchmembers Life Insurance Company and Glen Ashmore and separately and severally demur to plaintiff’s amended complaint for the reason that said amended complaint does not state facts, sufficient to constitute a cause of action against these defendants.
“MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER
“Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state a cause of action against these defendants for each of the following reasons:
“1. The facts alleged therein do not establish the artifically [artificially] created pit was an attractive nuisance.
“2. The facts alleged show that the plaintiff’s decedent was a trespasser upon the land of the defendant Churchmembers Life Insurance Company.
“3. The facts alleged do not show that the pit described therein was inherently dangerous.
“4. The facts alleged do not show that the pit described therein created an unreasonable risk to children of tender years.”
On the 8th day of January, 1958, the appellee, George F. Kopetsky, filed his demurrer to appellant’s amended complaint, which omitting the formal parts, reads as follows:
*677“Comes now the defendant George F. Kopetsky and demurrers to the plaintiff’s complaint for the following reasons:
“1. That said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against this defendant.
“MEMORANDUM
“Plaintiff’s complaint attempts to set up sufficient facts to base his cause of action on the legal principals of attractive nuisance but the facts alleged show that the doctrine is inapplicable here.
“The plaintiff fails to show facts which would attach liability to the defendant George F. Kopetsky and therefore his complaint should be dismissed.”
On the 9th day of January, 1958, the trial court sustained the separate demurrers of the appellees. The appellant refused to plead over and the court entered judgment for each of the appellees.
Thus the sole question presented here is the correctness of the trial court’s ruling in sustaining the demurrer to the amended complaint.
We recognize that water, whether in its natural state in streams, lakes or pools, and its contiguous banks, edges and shallows exerts a tremendous, and sometimes fatal fascination for children of all ages, as well as adults. We likewise realize that during the period of childhood, by nature children are carefree, curious, courageous, adventurous, daring, fearless and brave, and that as a result are attracted to what to them is the unusual, the new, the different, the modification or change of a familiar scene or object. Indeed such curiosity is not limited to children.
The appellant here urges the abandonment of the “attractive nuisance” rule now in effect in Indiana, and *678the adoption of the doctrine based on section 339, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Volume 2, commonly known as the Restatement Rule, which reads as follows:
“A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if
“(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and
“ (b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
“(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
“(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved therein.”
Jurisdictions applying the Restatement Rule are cited in 8 A. L. R. 2d 1286.
The careful and thorough presentation of the appellant’s propositions and authorities are persuasive, but not conclusive, no reason has been advanced to cause us to change the rule as it now exists in Indiana. We point out that even if the Restatement Rule was to be applied, recovery would be denied in most drowning cases where the danger is in plain view and is obvious.
“. . . In addition, it may be assumed that dangers which are commonly known, such as the usual risks of water, falling from a height, moving machinery, and of soil caving in, will be understood and appreciated by any child old enough to be alloioed to wander.” (Our emphasis.) 32 Ind. L. J. 85.
*679The appellant contends that the pit and surrounding banks were an attractive nuisance because they were not covered or fenced by the appellees. The law on fences in relation to attractive nuisances is well set out in 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, §151, p. 818 as follows:
“. . . The doctrine of attractive nuisance, it has been said, is limited in its application to cases where the danger is latent, and affords no basis for a recovery where the injury complained of was produced by a peril of an obvious or patent character. A danger which is not only obvious but natural, considering the instrumentality from which it arises, is not within the meaning of the attractive nuisance doctrine, for the reason that an owner or occupant is entitled to assume that the parents or guardians of a child will have warned him to avoid such a peril. Pits and excavations on land embody no dangers that are not readily apparent to everyone, even very young children. For this reason, the proprietor is under no obligation, as a rule, to fence or otherwise guard such places, and he will not be liable for injuries to children who may have fallen therein.”
The most recent decisive cases in point in Indiana are: Lockridge v. Standard Oil Co., Inc. (1954), 124 Ind. App. 257, 114 N. E. 2d 807; Neal, Admr. v. Home Builders, Inc. (1953), 232 Ind. 160, 111 N. E. 2d 280; Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co. (1950), 228 Ind. 518, 92 N. E. 2d 632; Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co. (1942), 112 Ind. App. 170, 44 N. E. 2d 184.
We conclude that the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrers to the amended complaint was correct, and the judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
Bobbitt, J., concurs. Achor, J., concurs in result. Arterburn, J., dissents with opinion. Landis, C. J., concurs in dissent.