concurring.
Trial Rule 15(C) of the Indiana Rules of Procedure qualifies the nature of the notice prescribed as a precondition to relation back. It requires merely receipt of "such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits." While the United States Supreme Court fails to recognize and implement this qualification in its application of the analogous Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) in Schiavone v. Fortune (1986), 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 LEd.2d 18, such decision does not compel us to an identical interpretation and application of our rule. See Gumz v. Starke County Farm Bureau Co-op. Assn. (1979), 271 Ind. 694, 395 N.E.2d 257; Celine Mutual Ins. Co. v. Forister (1982), Ind.App., 438 N.E.2d 1007; Hiatt v. Yergin (1972), 152 Ind.App. 497, 284 N.E.2d 834.
Because the filing of the complaint constituted constructive notice to the named defendants Earl Wilson and Max L. Wilson "within the period provided by law for commencing the action," I agree that such notice was likewise sufficient under T.R. 15(C) to timely notify Wilson Livestock Farms, Inc., the farming corporation of which the defendants were the sole officers and directors. The corporation cannot thereby be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the merits. See Honda Motor Co. v. Parks (1985), Ind.App., 485 N.E.2d 644; see also 2 W. Harvey, Indiana Practice 62-66 (2d ed. 1987); Harvey, Rules, Rulings for the Trial Lawyer, Res Gestae, July 1987, at 20, 28.
The majority opinion is consistent with the requirement of Trial Rule 1 that the Indiana Rules of Procedure "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
PIVARNIK, J., concurs.