(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the bright-line rule established by the United States Supreme Court in New York v Belton, 453 US 454; 101 S Ct 2860; 69 L Ed 2d 768 (1981), does not apply to the case sub judice, and it falls back on the older, more nebulous “immediate control” standard set forth in Chimel v California, 395 US 752; 89 S Ct 2034; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969). However, even assuming that the Chimel standard is the appropriate one in the present case, there exist scores of decisions suggesting that the instant dispute is not as cut and dried as the majority would have one believe. See, generally, anno: Modem status of mle as to validity of non-consensual search and seizure made without warrant after lawful arrest as affected by lapse of time between, or difference in places of, arrest and search, 19 ALR3d 727, § 9, pp 746-749 (search of automobile where arrest occurred near, but not in, automobile held valid).
Here, the police had ample reason to conclude that defendant was a dangerous individual and to approach defendant warily. Before the arrest, the police conducted a law enforcement information network check on defendant, which revealed that he had been charged six times with weapons offenses, *427though never convicted; that he had been charged six times with kidnapping and convicted twice; that he had been charged seven times with sexual assaults and convicted twice; that he had been charged three times with assault; and that he had been charged twice with larceny. Later, at defendant’s sentencing, the court determined that defendant had eight felony convictions. The police officers’ caution was both warranted and rewarded: defendant was, in fact, armed as they feared, and the circumspect procedures of the police negated any possibility that defendant would use his weapon.
Further, the search conducted was not so removed in time or space that one can immediately determine that it was “unreasonable,” the pertinent constitutional standard. US Const, Am IV. The majority does not contest that defendant’s arrest and his act of walking from the van occurred contemporaneously. With respect to defendant’s location, Chief of Police Mark Kik testified at the preliminary examination that defendant was- “probably 10, 12 feet from the van” when he was arrested. At the suppression hearing, Kik averred that defendant was not more than twenty to twenty-five feet from the van when he was arrested. Finally, and most significantly, the unrefuted evidence demonstrates that defendant left the driver’s side door of the van open and left a loaded pistol in the door pocket of the van door.
Given defendant’s proximity in time and location to the open van door containing his firearm, I agree with the trial court’s statement that “[i]t was a lawful arrest and there was a lawful search.” As recognized in both Belton and Chimel, searches incident to an arrest frequently occur after a defendant has been *428removed to the back seat of a patrol car and handcuffed. In other words, lawful searches have been conducted in situations far more removed in time and space than the search conducted in the present case, and in situations where there is virtually no possibility that the defendant will be able to obtain a hidden weapon. If these searches are deemed “reasonable,” US Const, Am IV, surely the search conducted in the present case is eminently more reasonable. Common sense would require police officers to remove a loaded pistol from the door pocket of an open van door.
The trial court found, in light of defendant’s criminal history and the proximity of the van, that the conduct of the officers was “simply prudent police work.” The majority does not challenge this finding. I agree with it.
I would affirm.