(dissenting ). Defendant-Appellant Xiong Yang obtained a fourth-grade education in Laos, *747where he was born in 1960. He and his family fled Laos in the wake of the takeover of the government by the Pathet Lao and the subsequent persecution of the Hmong. He studied English at Western Wisconsin Technical College. A teacher's aide described the first course that Yang took as "survival English!:] Learning how to read signs on men's and women's bathrooms, learning how ... to say hello, how are you, I'm fine, this is a nice day, this is a table, this is a chair. Real survival English." The second-level English course Yang took was more advanced, but did not contain vocabulary comparable to that an average kindergartner possesses. The teacher's aide described Yang's English ability as follows: "[I]f people would speak in slow !j sentences and basic, real basic English, Xiong could understand, but unless [they were] speaking slowly and in very basic English like you would to a small child, it wouldn't be understood."
Yang was convicted of sexual contact with a child. He filed a postconviction motion asking for a new trial, claiming he did not understand the proceedings and that the trial court should have appointed an interpreter to assist him. Alternatively, he alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an interpreter for him. The trial court denied his motion.
On appeal, Yang asks that we remand this case to the trial court to determine whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel did not poll the jury individually and did not inform him that he had a right to such polling. We permitted Yang to raise this request in his appellate reply brief. Because I would grant the remand, I respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes that when a defendant is represented by counsel, the decision whether to poll the jury may be made by counsel without informing the *748defendant of that right. The majority cites State v. Jackson, 188 Wis. 2d 537, 542-43, 525 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Ct. App. 1994), where we said: "Jackson was represented by counsel when the verdict was entered, and the decision to assert or waive certain rights, including whether to poll the jury, was delegated to that counsel." The majority misreads Jackson. All that we held was that it was not error for the trial court to fail to inquire of the defendant personally whether he or she wished to have the jury polled. See id. at 539-40, 525 N.W.2d at 166. We did not hold, however, that failure of trial counsel to discuss this very valuable right with his or her client was not deficient performance. Indeed, in view of our writings and the supreme court's writings as to the value of polling the jury, the proposition that counsel need not discuss this right with his or her client is startling. In State v. Wojtalewicz, 127 Wis. 2d 344, 379 N.W.2d 338 (Ct. App. 1985), we said: "The defendant's right to poll the jury has been described as '[t]he most substantial right of the accused in a felony case.'" Id. at 348, 379 N.W.2d at 340 (quoting Boreing v. Beard, 10 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Ky. Ct. App. 1928)). In State v. Behnke, 155 Wis. 2d 796, 456 N.W.2d 610 (1990), the supreme court approved our holding in Wojtalewicz, stating: "The right to poll the jury at the return of the verdict is a corollary to the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict.... The right to poll the jury is intertwined with the defendant's constitutional right to counsel at the return of the jury verdict." Id. at 801-02, 456 N.W.2d at 612 (citing Smith v. State, 51 Wis. 615, 8 N.W. 410 (1881)).
The defendant's right to poll the jury is not merely one of those abstract constitutional rights which is of little or no practical value. In State v. Cartagena, 140 Wis. 2d 59, 409 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1987), a juror *749changed his mind overnight after the verdict had been sealed and dissented before the verdict was accepted. We concluded that the sealed verdict lost its validity. Id. at 63, 409 N.W.2d at 388. In Jackson, I pointed out that the Criminal Benchbook Committee recommends that the trial court poll the jury in every case. 188 Wis. 2d at 543, 525 N.W.2d at 168 (citing WISCONSIN JUDI cial Benchbook, CR 25-3 (1994)) (Sundby, J., concurring).
It is especially important that this important right be carefully explained to a defendant who is of limited intelligence or does not have a firm grasp of the English language or any understanding at all as to how the criminal justice system works. I would therefore grant Yang's request to remand this case to the trial court for a hearing as to whether trial counsel informed Yang of his right to poll the individual members of the jury and whether Yang understood the purpose of such polling.
If there is a petition for review of our decision, I urge the supreme court to grant review to clarify the respective rights and responsibilities of trial counsel and the trial court with respect to this important right. Our decisions are not consistent. As the majority opinion notes, Majority op. at 738-39 n.8, in State v. Reichling, No. 94-1818-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 6, 1995), we initially held that the defendant's right to poll the jury was personal to the defendant, and counsel was deficient if he or she failed to inform the defendant of this right. Subsequently, we withdrew this opinion and on September 28, 1995, reissued our opinion in which we held that when counsel is present with the defendant when the jury returns its verdict, failure to inform the defendant of his or her right to poll jurors individually is not, in itself, deficient performance. State v. Reichling, No. 94-*7501818-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1995).
Perhaps the simplest way to avoid this confusion and recognize that the right to poll the jurors individually is a valuable right, is for the supreme court to make mandatory the recommendation of the Criminal Benchbook Committee that the trial court poll the jurors individually in every case.