dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision to remand. In Collins v. Day (1994), Ind., 644 N.E.2d 72, our supreme court set forth a new analytical framework for evaluating statutory compliance with Article I, Section 28 of the Indiana Constitution. Acknowledging that the trial court's ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment in Ledbetter v. Hunter (1995), Ind.App., 652 N.E.2d 543, was issued prior to Collins, we remanded the case for further consideration in light of the new method of analysis. Ledbetter, 652 N.E.2d at 550. In the case before us, the ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment was also issued prior to Collins. Here, however, when scheduling oral argument we specifically directed the parties to "familiarize themselves with the opinion in Ledbetter and be prepared to discuss that opinion and its application to the facts of this case." The parties appropriately complied, and on August 15, 1995 both sides presented compelling and persuasive arguments. When we inquired as to what additional evidence might be submitted to the trial court should we order remand, or what additional arguments might be presented on possible remand, counsel for appellants indicated that he would rely on the evidence already submitted, and that his argument would be substantially the same as presented *303before this court. The reply from counsel for appellees was somewhat equivocal.
In any event, as outlined in Collins, Article I, Section 28 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to different classes of persons: (1) the disparate treatment accorded the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes, and (2) the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Id. at 80. The questions squarely before us include the following: Who are the unequally treated classes to be compared in this case? Are they the health care providers who allegedly engage in acts of negligence verses non-health care providers who allegedly engage in acts of negligence? If so, is the different treatment of the two classes based upon dis-tinetive, inherent characteristics? What are the inherent characteristics? Is the unequal treatment reasonably related to such characteristics? On the other hand, are the unequally treated classes here composed of the children, those allegedly injured by health care providers versus those allegedly injured by non-health care providers? Is the different treatment of the two classes of children based upon distinctive, inherent characteristics? What are they and how is the unequal treatment reasonably related to them? Does it make a difference how the class is characterized? Why or why not?
Given the nature of this case, the state of the record before us, and the representations made by counsel at oral argument, it is my view that the trial court is in no better position than is this court to tackle the very difficult questions posed here. Remand is unnecessary. We should address on its merits whether the limitation provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act are violative of Article I, Section 28. Therefore I am compelled to disagree with the majority on this point. In all other respects I concur.