(concurring in part; dissenting in part). Plaintiffs, who are inmates or former inmates of Columbia Correctional Institution (CCI), bring this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against Warden Jeffrey Endicott. They allege that Endicott violated their liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing a "Management Continuum" policy promulgated June 1, 1992. The policy reads:
Due to recent incidents that have required repeated cell entries and/or use of chemical agents on inmates already in Control Status who have used property to obstruct the view into their cell, effective immediately, all inmates placed in Control Status will be limited to a mattress and undershorts. They will be allowed only this amount of property so long as they are in that status. These actions are being taken to protect both staff and inmates. This memo supersedes all other memos from this office or the Security Director on this subject.
Inmates Omowale Nubian Black and James Griffin have been subjected to this policy and Kevin Kirsch alleges that he experiences severe anxiety at the likely prospect of being subjected to the policy. The policy is contrary to WlS. Adm. Code § DOC 303.71 which provides that inmates in controlled segregation shall be provided adequate clothing, essential hygiene *720supplies and the same diet provided to the general prison population. It is undisputed that the Management Continuum policy permits CCI to impose on inmates in controlled segregation restrictions not permitted under § DOC 303.71. It is also undisputed that such restrictions are imposed on inmates who have not used property to obstruct the view of their cells, and are imposed without notice and opportunity to be heard.
The inmates allege that the Management Continuum policy violates their liberty interests created by § DOC 303.71. They argue that this rule created in them a protected liberty interest. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469 (1983). However, in Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299-2300 (1995), the Court rejected the Hewitt approach because it involved the courts excessively in the day-to-day management of prisons. The Court said:
The time has come to return to the due process principles we believe were correctly established and applied in Wolff1 and Meachum.2 Following Wolff, we recognize that states may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. But these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Id. at 2300 (citations omitted; footnote omitted).
*721Section DOC 303.71 imposes restraints on an inmate in temporary lockup or segregation of any kind "who exhibits loud and seriously disruptive ... or destructive behavior . . . ." However, the rule does not create an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." In other words, controlled segregation under § DO C 303.71 does not impose restraints or conditions of restraint beyond those the inmate and society could reasonably expect. In fact, the inmate is treated almost embarrassingly humanely: a clean mattress, a sanitary toilet and sink, adequate ventilation and heating, adequate clothing and bedding, hygienic supplies, writing and mailing materials, holy books, legal research materials, visitation and telephone privileges, mail, and the same diet as the general prison population.
Further, an inmate may not be placed in controlled segregation except upon notice and opportunity to be heard. In contrast, the stark, barbarous conditions of Management Continuum are imposed without considerations of guilt and without opportunity to be heard. Inmates now placed in controlled segregation suffer the deprivations of Management Continuum solely because of the misbehavior of inmates who preceded them in controlled segregation.
The Warden justifies stripping inmates of the basic necessities as a "management" necessity and not punishment. He does not explain, however, how restricting the inmate to bag lunches furthers the "management" objective of preventing inmates from obstructing the view of their cells. How does stripping the inmate of shoes, socks, trousers, and an undershirt further that objective? Clearly, the "Management" Continuum contains a punitive as well as a *722management component. Under the Sandin test, we must ask whether the Warden's Management Continuum subjects inmates to "atypical, significant deprivation [s] in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." 115 S. Ct. at 2301. The answer to-that question, according to the Sandin Court, is found by comparing inmates subject to disciplinary segregation and those in the general prison population. Id.
In Sandin, the inmate claimed that he was denied procedural due process because he was placed in segregation without having an opportunity to present witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. The committee found him guilty of misconduct and placed him in disciplinary segregation. The Court looked at the seriousness of the consequences of the committee's decision and decided that the inmate's confinement "does not present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate's] indeterminate sentence." Id. Therefore, no constitutional liberty interest was implicated. The Court said:
Based on a comparison between inmates inside and outside disciplinary segregation, the State's actions in placing [the inmate] there for 30 days did not work a major disruption in his environment.
Id. (emphasis added).
Plainly, the Warden's Management Continuum works a major disruption in an inmate's environment, even one who has been placed in controlled segregation pursuant to due process disciplinary procedures. If freedom from such a disruption in environment is not protected by § DOC 303.71, it is protected by the Due Process Clause itself.
*723I have no problem concluding that before an inmate may be subjected to the conditions which potentially exist under the Warden's Management Continuum, he must be given the protection of substantive and procedural due process. However, I conclude that two of the inmates, Kevin Kirsch and Omowale Nubian Black, have failed to present evidence that they are presently subject to the Continuum or have been in the past. They seem to seek declaratory relief that the Management Continuum is per se unconstitutional. That is not the case.
Kirsch's affidavit speaks to the effect of the Management Continuum on other inmates. Black's affidavit speaks only to the Warden's counterclaim. Only Griffin's affidavit presents evidence as to the effect of the Continuum upon him. He deposes that on "numerous occasions" he has been subjected to the Management Continuum policy: He has been placed in a cell with only a mattress and undershorts; he has been denied additional clothing and bedding; and he has suffered from the cold which has caused him lack of sleep, anger and depression. For purposes of the summary judgment dismissing Griffin's complaint, these allegations must be accepted. I conclude that Griffin has stated a claim and is entitled to summary judgment that the Warden's Management Continuum policy has been imposed against him in violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
I express no opinion as to whether an inmate subjected to § DOC 303.71 may have his placement reviewed in an appropriate state-law action. Plaintiffs have raised only constitutional issues and they are clearly sufficiently well versed in the law that we need not construe their pleadings to raise state-law questions.
*724For these reasons, I dissent from our decision insofar as we affirm the order dismissing Griffin's claim.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).