(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the majority’s handling of issues I, m, iv, v, vi, and vn. I dissent from certain statements made in the resolution of issue n.
While I believe the majority correctly rejects defendant’s assertion that the complainant’s testimony that she had been a virgin and the prosecution’s references to the complainant’s virginity denied him a fair trial, I disagree with its reasoning. I would simply hold that defendant waived any error in this regard because he did not object in the trial court and did not attempt to cross-examine the complainant regarding her claimed chastity. The majority’s rejection of defendant’s argument, however, contains dicta in its discussion of the rape-shield statute with which I cannot agree.1
The majority concludes that a sexual assault victim may testify regarding her lack of prior sexual activity without thereby opening the door to the issue and allowing the defendant to cross-examine the alleged victim regarding such an assertion. I believe such a ruling would constitute a denial of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Initially, I would note that a sexual assault victim’s testimony that she *381had previously been a virgin would be inadmissible under MRE 404(a)(3),2 which states:
Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(3) Character of victim of sexual conduct crime. In a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the defendant and evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source of origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
See also State v Butler, 11 Conn App 673, 683; 529 A2d 219 (1987), where the Connecticut Court of Appeals held that assertion of virginity was not relevant to any material issue in a sexual assault case, and Johnson v State, 146 Ga App 277, 281; 246 SE2d 363 (1978), where the court held that testimony on direct examination relating to the chastity of the complaining witness was inadmissible.
Obviously, the error in admitting such evidence would be compounded if the trial court then refused to allow the defendant to challenge such evidence. See People v Lewis, 160 Mich App 20, 27-28; 408 NW2d 94 (1987). However, if such testimony is purposefully admitted, notwithstanding the prohibition of MRE 404(a)(3), I would find that the sexual assault victim has declined the protections of the rape-shield statute. Once such a. declination occurs, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation would *382allow cross-examination regarding such a claim. Indeed, such evidence was admissible at common law. People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 344; 365 NW2d 120 (1984).
The Supreme Court has noted that under certain limited situations exclusion of evidence under the rape-shield statute may unconstitutionally abridge a defendant’s right to confrontation. Hackett, supra. As examples, the Court noted that evidence involving the complainant’s prior sexual conduct must be allowed if it would show bias or an ulterior motive for making a false charge or indicate the victim had made false accusations in the past. Id. at 348.
I would similarly hold that a defendant’s right to confrontation is abridged when a victim affirmatively testifies on direct examination that she was a virgin unless a defendant is then allowed to cross-examine the complainant regarding the claim.
In People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486, 499-500; 251 NW 594 (1933), the Michigan Supreme Court described the right of cross-examination as follows:
One of the elementary principles of cross-examination is that the party having the right to cross-examine has a right to draw out from the witness and lay before the jury anything tending or which may tend to contradict, weaken, modify or explain the testimony of the witness on direction examination or which tends or may tend to elucidate the testimony or affect the credibility of the witness. [Emphasis added.]
Enactment of the rape-shield statute reflected the Legislature’s determination that, in the overwhelming majority of prosecutions, evidence of a rape victim’s sexual conduct with parties other than the defendant is neither an accurate measure of the victim’s veracity *383nor determinate of the likelihood of consensual sexual relations with the defendant. People v LaLone, 432 Mich 103; 437 NW2d 611 (1989); People v Lucas (On Remand), 193 Mich App 298; 484 NW2d 685 (1992). However, when a victim asserts that she was a virgin in an effort to establish that she did not consent to charged conduct, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation would require that he be allowed to cross-examine such a claim. Dellabonda, supra.
While a court can limit cross-examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination, MRE 611(b), the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does not permit foreclosing cross-examination of a matter asserted on direct examination. Dellabonda, supra. Accord State v Mastropetre, 175 Conn 512; 400 A2d 276 (1978), where the Connecticut Supreme Court held that if a complaining witness testifies on direct examination that she had been chaste before the time of the assault, the defendant was clearly entitled to challenge the assertion on cross-examination, and State v Williams, 21 Ohio St 3d 33, 36; 487 NE2d 560 (1986), where the Ohio Supreme Court held that if a victim testifies on direct examination that she never consents to sex with men, the probative value of the defendant’s proffered testimony to the contrary outweighs any interest the state has via its rape-shield statute in excluding such testimony. See also Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U Pa L Rev 544, 583 (1980) (prior sexual history of victim is relevant and must be admitted when issue is first raised by the prosecution; once in issue, the defense should be allowed to refute it).
This Court need not consider constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal. Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234, n 23; 507 NW2d 422 (1993).
The question whether this rule of evidence supersedes the rape-shield statute apparently remains unresolved. See People v Lalone, 432 Mich 103, 108; 437 NW2d 611 (1989).