I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury regarding the cognate lesser included offense of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less *683than murder. If the defendant had initially been charged only with that assault offense, he could have been convicted because the evidence adduced at trial would have supported a conviction. The majority’s analysis of the causation issue and its effect on the resolution of the issue before this Court ignores the import of the rule that this Court established in People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975).1 The refusal to instruct in this instance was not harmless error, and requires reversal.
I. REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS IMPROPERLY REFUSED
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant correctly categorizes assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder as a cognate lesser included offense to the principal charged offense of second-degree murder. Further, I agree with the majority’s recitation of the rule explaining when cognate lesser included offense instructions are required to be given. However, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that, in this case, the trial court properly refused the requested instruction regarding the assault offense.
Ora Jones and its progeny have conclusively provided when a cognate lesser included offense instruction must be given:
The duty of the trial judge to instruct on lesser included offenses is determined by the evidence. If evidence has *684been presented which would support a conviction of a lesser included offense, refusal to give a requested instruction is reversible error.
In the area of “cognate” lesser offenses, the evidence in each case adduced at the particular trial must be examined to determine whether that evidence would support a conviction of the lesser offense. . . .
[If] the evidence adduced at trial would have supported a guilty verdict on the [requested] offense . . ., the trial court was required to accede to defendant’s request to instruct the jury that such offense was a lesser included offense of the charge of second-degree murder. [Id. at 390 (citations omitted).]
Thus, in this case, the proper inquiry is whether the evidence adduced at trial would have supported a conviction for the assault offense. The majority only should have looked at the elements of the assault offense and the evidence adduced at trial when determining whether that threshold was met.
In order to convict a defendant of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, the prosecution must prove the elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. As noted by the majority, the elements of that offense are “(1) an assault, i.e., ‘an attempt or offer with force and violence to do corporal hurt to another’ coupled with (2) a specific intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.” See part ii(b), ante, pp 668-669 (citation omitted).
In the instant case, the prosecution introduced evidence that an assault occurred. At trial, even the defendant admitted that he hit Mr. Peoples twice with a bat. The only other relevant question then becomes whether evidence was introduced at trial from which *685the jury could infer that the defendant acted with the specific intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.
At trial, the prosecution’s theory was that the defendant possessed the requisite intent for second-degree murder.2 More specifically, in closing argument the prosecutor argued: “By striking [Mr. Peoples], [the defendant] put him in such danger of great bodily harm, the reasonable likelihood of which is going to be death.” In contrast, the defense’s theory was that the defendant did not intend to kill Mr. Peoples, nor did he intend to cause him great bodily harm: the defendant testified that he did not intend to kill Mr. Peoples, and that his intent in hitting him with a bat was “[j]ust to hit him.”
As stated in People v Mack, 112 Mich App 605, 611; 317 NW2d 190 (1981) (citation omitted), “[t]he specific intent necessary to constitute the offense may be found in conduct as well as words.” Similarly, the jury may infer the defendant’s specific intent from the circumstantial evidence. People v Eggleston, 149 Mich App 665; 386 NW2d 637 (1986), citing People v Vicuna, 141 Mich App 486; 367 NW2d 887 (1985). The key point is that the jury could have rejected both theories and instead found, considering the surrounding circumstances, including the number and location of the blows, that the defendant acted with the specific intent to do great bodily harm less than murder when he struck the decedent with the bat.
*686Even though a finding of that intent would support the requisite intent for second-degree murder, it would also support the requisite intent for the assault offense. However, it is important to recognize that it was solely the jury’s responsibility to decide whether to convict the defendant of one crime or the other.3 By refusing to instruct regarding the assault offense, the trial judge precluded the jury from determining that the defendant was guilty of that offense, and not of homicide.4 Because the evidence adduced at trial would have supported a conviction for the assault *687offense, the trial court was required to accede to the defendant’s request for the assault instruction. Failure to do so was error requiring reversal.
The trial judge’s refusal to give the requested assault instruction was not harmless error because the jury did not convict the defendant of the charged offense of second-degree murder. Instead, the jury chose to convict him of the cognate lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Thus, we are uncertain whether the jury possibly would have convicted him of the assault offense rather than voluntary manslaughter had that instruction been given.
n. CAUSATION ISSUE IS IRRELEVANT
The analysis of the majority opinion began with the recitation of the Ora Jones rule and should have ended with the conclusion that evidence would have supported a guilty verdict for the assault offense. The causation issue presented by the facts in the instant case is irrelevant to the determination whether the requested assault instruction should have been given.5
*688By launching into the causation issue and then using that analysis to conclude that the instruction was properly refused, the majority essentially held that it was permissible for the trial judge to usurp the jury’s determination of all essential elements of the offense. However, as this Court has stated on numerous occasions, the jury could choose to believe or disbelieve any or all the evidence.6 Thus, there is no support for the majority’s statement that
it is neither necessary nor sound policy to require the trial court to blind itself to uncontroverted proof of an element of the greater crime that would necessarily raise a defendant’s culpability to that of the more serious crime, if all elements common to the two offenses were found to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Where a defendant admits activity that, as a matter of law, constitutes proof of the distinguishing element, [here, death] the basis for instruction on the lesser crime evaporates. [Part n(c), ante, p 671.]
Further, a prior decision7 of a similar issue by this Court does not support the majority’s conclusions that
*689[i]f [death] has occurred, and the defendant’s admitted act constitutes a legally cognizable cause of the death, instruction of the jury regarding crimes not intended to punish acts causing such an egregious result are logically precluded. At the point a court has before it uncontested evidence that a criminal homicide has been caused by a defendant’s acts, there is no justification for instruction on merely assaultive offenses. If a lesser cognate instruction is to be justified in such an instance, there must be some evidentiary basis for the jury to conclude that the causation chain leading from the greater harm back to defendant’s admitted acts has been broken by an independent, intervening cause. [Part n(c), ante, pp 671-672 (emphasis added).]
By focusing on whether the defendant presented evidence of an independent, intervening cause of the decedent’s death, the majority does not remain faithful to the rule announced in Ora Jones. According to Ora Jones, the instruction should have been given because the jury could have found the defendant guilty of the assault offense on the basis of the evidence presented at trial. Evidence was presented that an assault occurred, as well as evidence from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant acted with the specific intent to do great bodily harm less than murder.
Additionally, although the majority seems to acknowledge that this Court rejected a similar argument in People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d *690473 (1975), it does not analyze this case in conformity with that decision. As noted by the majority, in Chamblis, “this Court rejected an inquiry into the evidence adduced at trial that would direct a trial court to determine if ‘there is evidence which would jus tify the jury in concluding that the greater offense was not committed and a lesser included offense was committed.’ ” Part n(c), ante, p 670. However, this is exactly the force of the majority’s analysis. In this case, the majority opines that assault instructions should not be given when the victim dies as a result of the assault, because there is no evidence that would justify the jury concluding that some homicide offense was not committed. Thus, I do not endorse the majority’s analysis, and instead prefer to remain faithful to Chamblis, which “favored allowing greater jury discretion to bring in any verdict it deemed just by inquiring simply whether the evidence adduced at trial would support a guilty verdict on the lesser charge, had defendant only been charged on the lesser offense.” Id.
in. CONCLUSION
The court’s refusal to instruct the jury regarding the cognate lesser included offense of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder was error requiring reversal. The refusal removed an appropriate lesser offense from the jury’s consideration. Because the jury chose to acquit the defendant of the charged offense of second-degree murder and instead convicted him of another lesser included offense, the error was not harmless. Thus, I would affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals and remand for a *691new trial, in which the trial court should be required to give the assault instruction if requested.
Brickley, C.J., and Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.The majority criticizes our adherence to the rule in Ora Jones, stating that we disregard the clarification and evolution of the law of lesser included offenses since it was decided. We acknowledge that the law in this area has evolved; however, no post-1975 cases have eroded the rule established in Ora Jones to an extent that we would consider the disputed instruction improperly given.
As the majority noted, the requisite intent for second-degree murder is the intent to kill, intent to inflict great bodily harm, or intent to create a very high risk of death with the knowledge that the act probably will cause death or great bodily harm. Part 11(B).
In People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408, 420-421; 236 NW2d 473 (1975) (citations omitted; emphasis added), this Court noted:
The jury is the sole judge of all of the facts presented. It may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of the evidence. That is the essence of the right to a jury trial. To speak of a requirement that the jury ‘justify” its conclusion that the defendant is not guilty of the higher charge before “allowing” it to convict of the lesser is antithetical to the nature of a jury trial.
“It is the policy of the law to allow juries a latitude which is not hemmed in by absolute logic. Many considerations enter into a jury’s verdict which cannot be itemized and weighted in a chart of legal instructions. A jury is expected to stay within the bounds of reason, yet they may indulge tender mercies even to the point of acquitting the plainly guilty. Similarly they may, on almost any excuse, convict of a lower degree of crime although conviction of a higher degree is clearly warranted.”
As stated in Chamblis:
Directed verdicts of guilt in criminal jury trials are forbidden by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments:
“Once a plea of not guilty is entered, the defendant ‘has an absolute right to a jury determination upon all essential elements of the offense. This right, emanating from the criminal defendant’s constitutional right to trial by jury, is neither depleted nor diminished by what otherwise might be considered the conclusive or compelling nature of the evidence against him .... [F\urthermore, in a situation wherein an understandingly tendered waiver is not forthcoming from the defendant, under no circumstances may the trial *687court usurp this right by ruling as a matter of law on an essential element of the crime charged,' ”
Because the jury is the sole judge of all the facts, it can choose, without any apparent logical basis, what to believe and what to disbelieve. What may appeal to the judge as “undisputed” need not be believed by a jury.
“When [defendant\ exercised his constitutional right to a jury, he put the government to the burden of proving the elements of the crimes charged to a jury's satisfaction, not to ours or to the district judge’s.” [Id., n 3 supra at 420-421 (citations omitted; emphasis added).]
As stated in Chamblis, n 3 supra at 415, “[n] either the defense nor the prosecution has the option of precluding the court from carrying out [its duty to instruct the jury with respect to the law applicable to the case] in hopes of forcing an ‘all or nothing’ verdict.”
The majority states that the defendant did not present any evidence to permit the jury to determine that he did not act with malice or that his act was not the cause of decedent’s death. See ante, p 671, n 10. That is incorrect. First, at trial, the defendant testified that his only intent was to hit the decedent. He testified that he did not intend to kill the decedent. If the jury chose to believe the defendant, it could have found that he did not act with malice. Second, at trial, there was testimony elicited from a defense witness that the decedent’s brother kicked the decedent twice in the left side after the defendant hit the decedent with a bat. Thus, if the jury chose to believe that testimony, it could have found that the defendant was not the cause of the decedent’s death.
I do not agree with the majority’s decision to reverse People v Boles, 420 Mich 851; 358 NW2d 894 (1984), to the extent that its instant holding is inconsistent with it. Rather, I would reaffirm our decision in Boles, because that is what Ora Jones requires. Further, I note that our decision *689in Boles clearly mandates the giving of the requested instruction in this case, because that result was also required in Boles, even though in that case the defendant was clearly the cause of the decedent’s death. In fact, the defendant presented the defense of self-defense. Additionally, in Boles, the defendant’s acts were the only possible cause of the decedent’s injuries that caused death. There was no other actor or factor involved that could have been the cause of the decedent’s death.