([dissenting). I would grant leave to appeal. The question whether a criminal defendant may withdraw his plea after sentencing on the grounds that he pleaded guilty while unadvised of adverse immigration consequences is one of first *455impression. Instead of issuing a per curiam opinion, this Court should give itself and the parties the benefit of full briefing and oral argument.
i
In 1988, a panel of the Court of Appeals decided the issue presented in this case in the matter of People v Kadadu, 169 Mich App 278; 425 NW2d 784 (1988). Like defendant Davidovich, defendant Kadadu had been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court “decided that it would be more equitable to allow defendant to go to trial before suffering the extreme consequences of deportation.” Kadadu, supra at 285. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exercise of discretion, declaring itself
hard pressed to find an abuse of discretion where a trial court has opted to grant a criminal defendant an opportunity to proceed to trial and there is no showing that the prosecution is prejudiced by defendant’s decision to proceed to trial. [Id.)
In this case, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. People v Davidovich.1 The panel relied on this Court’s recent opinion in People v Osaghae2 and case law from other jurisdictions. Davidovich, supra at 427.
As both the Court of Appeals and the majority acknowledge, Osaghae can be distinguished from this case and from Kadadu. Ante, pp 452-453; Davidovich, *456supra at 427. In Osaghae, this Court held that there was no sound basis for challenging a guilty plea when the “federal consequences under federal immigration law did not exist on the day the plea was taken.” Osaghae, supra at 534. This Court differentiated Osaghae from Kadadu: “[T]he federal law placing Mr. Kadadu at risk of deportation was already on the books at the time of his plea.” Osaghae, supra at 533. This Court then overruled Kadadu, but only to the extent it conflicted with Osaghae.
Osaghae did not address the consequences of pleading guilty when unadvised and ignorant of existing immigration law. Hence, it did not find that a sound basis for challenging the plea involved in this case was lacking. It acknowledged as much.
The Court of Appeals appears to have read Osaghae too broadly. This Court should allow defendant the opportunity to brief and argue this issue before deciding to extend Osaghae to the facts presented here.
n
“When first made after sentencing, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the. trial court’s decision will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” People v Ovalle, 222 Mich App 463, 465; 564 NW2d 147 (1997); People v Winegar, 380 Mich 719, 730-731; 158 NW2d 395 (1968). See also MCR 6.311(A).
An interesting question is raised here, as in Kadadu, whether the trial court’s decision to allow defendant to withdraw his plea was incorrect and *457rose to an abuse of discretion. Defendant pleaded guilty on November 17, 1997, and was sentenced on January 6, 1998. He moved to withdraw his plea only two months later. At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor stated that the people’s case would not be prejudiced should the matter go to trial.
In Osaghae, this Court emphasized that “[o]ur system of criminal justice has a substantial interest in finality . . . ” Id. at 534. There, the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea nearly five years after it had been accepted. Osaghae, supra at 530. The reference to finality, quoted both in Osaghae and in the majority opinion here, is drawn from McMann v Richardson,3 which refers to motions to withdraw pleas brought years after the plea. Because defendant Davidovich moved to withdraw his plea only two months after sentencing, arguments concerning the interest of finality are unpersuasive.
m
Deportation is a serious measure. It may result “in loss of both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living.” Ng Fung Ho v White.4 It may be a more severe penalty than the sentence meted out for the underlying crime.
In this case, for instance, defendant’s sentence was one year of probation. Defendant owns a business and is married.5 As a result of this conviction, he will *458conceivably his family. The trial court determined that one year’s probation served the interests of justice for defendant’s crime. Given that his deportation will exact a far greater penalty than that on him, it is questionable whether he pleaded guilty knowingly and intelligently.
As the majority points out, most jurisdictions considering the question have concluded that one need not be advised of immigration consequences when tendering a guilty plea. Ante, p 453, n 8. It bears noting, however, that this conclusion is not without its critics.6 Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes requiring courts to inform defendants of possible immigration consequences before they accept their guilty pleas.7 Whether Michigan should follow this trend deserves more deliberate consideration than we give it today. I would grant leave.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.238 Mich App 422, 423, 431; 606 NW2d 387 (1999). Because Kadadu was decided before 1990, the Court of Appeals panel was not bound by it. MCR 7.215(H)(1).
(On Reconsideration), 460 Mich 529; 596 NW2d 911 (1999).
397 US 759, 773-774; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970).
259 US 276, 284; 42 S Ct 492; 66 L Ed 938 (1922).
It is not clear from the record whether defendant’s wife, Elizabeth Ann Davidovich, née Lukomski, is an American citizen. According to the defendant’s presentence report, defendant did meet and many her after he arrived in this country in 1991.
See People v Pozo, 746 P2d 523 (Colo, 1987); Williams v State, 641 NE2d 44 (Ind App, 1995). See also note, Deportation as a collateral consequence of a guilty plea: Why the federal precedent should be reevaluated, 26 Val U L R 895 (1992); note, Weakness of the collateral consequences doctrine: Counsel’s duty to inform aliens of the deportation consequences of guilty pleas, 16 Fordham Int’l L J 1094 (1993); note, Alien defendants in criminal proceedings: Justice shrugs, 36 Am Crim L R 1395 (1999).
Cal Penal Code § 1016.5; Conn Gen Stat § 54-1j; Mass Gen Laws ch 278, § 29D; Or Rev Stat § 135.385; Rev Code Wash § 10.40.200.
These statutes require the trial court to inform a defendant who is not a citizen of the United States that conviction of the offense charged may result in (1) deportation, (2) exclusion from admission to the United States, or (3) denial of naturalization pursuant to the law of the United States. See, e.g., Cal Penal Code § 1016.5(a).