dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. There was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding of promissory estoppel in my opinion.
Bogard had been doing business with Security for 34 years. Throughout this relationship, Security apparently had cloaked its Oaktown branch managers with the authority to approve whatever loans the managers and Bogard agreed upon. The lending committee's so-called final approval was a mere "rubber stamp" formality under the apparent authority the bank bestowed upon the two branch managers with whom Bogard had dealt during that period.
Over the years, Bogard had relied upon the branch managers' claims they had the authority to make the loans he had received from time to time. Bogard never had been turned down and was, according to Security's assertions, a good customer. Based upon past practice, Bogard reasonably believed he would receive the loan he needed to prepare for his upcoming year's farming transactions because the branch manager had approved it. Nothing in the evidence can reasonably be said to put him on notice the approval procedure for this loan would be different from the bank's past practice.
Farming provided Bogard with his livelihood, Bogard's reliance was of a substantial character. Given the long standing nature of the relationship and the detriment which arose from the bank's refusal to make the loan, it is clear to me injustice *970can be avoided only by enforcing the agreement. See, Citizens State Bank v. Peoples Bank (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 324, 327; Larabee v. Booth (1984), Ind.App., 463 N.E.2d 487, 490; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (West 1981).
A general judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory by evidence introduced at trial. Erie-Haven v. Tippmann Refrigeration Construction (1985), Ind.App., 486 N.E.2d 646, 648. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's finding on the basis of promissory estoppel and remand for further proceedings to determine appropriate damages.