dissenting.
I see no appreciable distinction between this case and PYA/Monarch v. Harris, 22 Va.App. 215, 468 S.E.2d 688 (1996). The majority points to differences in PYA/Monarch and the instant case, but such differences are not material to *318the ratio decidendi of PYA/Monarch. Furthermore, the majority, like the commission, bases its decision on Basement Waterproofing v. Beland, 43 Va.App. 352, 597 S.E.2d 286 (2004); however, the clear distinction between the instant case and Beland is that here, unlike Beland, the claimant was not in a “uniquely dangerous” position at the time of his injury. Id. at 360, 597 S.E.2d at 290; cf. Turf Care, Inc. v. Henson, 51 Va.App. 318, 657 S.E.2d 787 (March 4, 2008). For these reasons, I would reverse the commission’s decision in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent.