(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion fails to apply the statutory requirements of “arising out of and in the course of employment” in determining whether compensation is appropriate in this case. Rather, the majority opinion concludes that because the employee’s activities at the time of injury were “reasonable,” recovery should be allowed. In my view, compensation should be denied, as the facts clearly indicate that employee’s injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.
An injury “arises out of” employment when it appears from all the facts and circumstances that there is a causal connection between the employment and the employee’s injury. Bonfig v. Megarry Bros., 294 Minn. 180, 199 N.W.2d 796 (1972); Cavilla v. Northern States Power Co., 213 Minn. 331, 6 N.W.2d 812 (1942). The requisite causal connection exists if the employment, by reason of its nature, obligations, or incidents, is the source of the injury-producing hazard. Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957).
The shooting incident which resulted in employee’s injury outside the tavern was entirely unconnected with his employment. There was no hazard associated with employee’s duties as a busdriver that increased his risk of injury beyond that shared by the general public. See Auman v. Breckenridge Telephone Co., 188 Minn. 256, 246 N.W. 889 (1933). The risk of being injured by bullets fired at random by an intoxicated person outside a tavern was not an incident of the exposure occasioned by the nature of employee’s work. See Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 249 Minn, at 56, 81 N.W.2d at 276. Since employee failed to demonstrate a causal connection between the hazard producing his injury and his employment, it cannot be said that his injury arose out of his employment.
As a condition precedent to recovery of workers’ compensation benefits, employee must also prove that his injury occurred in the course of his employment. The phrase “in the course of employment” refers to the time, place, and circumstances surrounding the accident. Swenson v. Zacher, 264 Minn. 203, 207, 118 N.W.2d 786, 789 (1962); 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 14.00 (1978). In order to be compen-sable, an injury must arise within the time and space boundaries of the employment. Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. at 56, 81 N.W.2d at 276. An employee is not covered under the statutory definition set *140forth in section 176.011, subd. 16, except while he is “engaged in, on, or about the premises where his services require his presence as a part of such service at the time of injury and during the hours of such service.” It is evident that these requirements have not been met in this case.
Employee was not engaged in performing services for his employer at the time of the accident. He had certain duties to perform on Saturday morning that involved approximately 2 hours of work. After that time, he was free to do as he wished. Employee’s accident did not occur during the hours that he was actually discharging his duties as a busdriver. Further, the shooting incident took place at a tavern located some distance from the camp, rather than at a location where employee’s services were being performed or where his employment required his presence as a part of those services. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that employee was injured in the course of his employment.
Reliance by the majority on the traveling salesmen cases is misplaced. In situations involving traveling salesmen, identifiable time and space boundaries are generally not imposed. A salesman is considered as carrying his working premises with him and is, therefore, able to structure his own time and hours of service while traveling on his employer’s business. He is compensated under the workers’ compensation statute because he is constructively on or about the premises where his services require his presence as part of such service at the time of injury and during the hours of such service. Bonfig v. Megarry Bros., 294 Minn, at 184, 199 N.W.2d at 799.
In contrast, employee in this case had a set working schedule and a definite time period in which his duties were to be completed. At the time employee was injured, he was not engaged in pursuing activities that furthered his employer’s business. Also, employee’s accident did not occur on the premises where his services were being performed. Consequently, this case is more analogous to Bonfig v. Megarry Bros., 294 Minn. 180, 199 N.W.2d 796 (1962), and Gavilla v. Northern States Power Co., 213 Minn. 331, 6 N.W.2d 812 (1942), in which the court denied compensation benefits.
The majority opinion relies in part on this court’s decision in Epp v. Midwestern Machinery Co., 296 Minn. 231, 208 N.W.2d 87 (1973).1 The unique factual situation in Epp, however, is clearly distinguishable from that in the instant case. The employer in Epp expressly authorized and assumed the expense of the employee’s motel bill, food, and alcoholic beverages. By necessity, the employee, an over-the-road truekdri-ver, was required to eat or drink at public restaurants. Here, however, employee’s meals and lodging, as well as recreational facilities, were provided at the camp. The employer did not reimburse employee for the cost of food and drink incurred while away from the camp. If he chose to have his meals in town, he was responsible for his own transportation and expenses. In addition, the employee in Epp was allowed to set his own time and hours of service. In this case, employee had certain duties to perform on the morning of the accident and was then allowed to spend his free time engaging in his own activities. The decision in Epp, therefore, is not substantially on point.
Similarly, Snyder v. General Paper Corp., 277 Minn. 376, 152 N.W.2d 743 (1967), also cited in the majority opinion, is inapposite. In Snyder, the employee was entertaining a prospective customer at dinner, pursuant to his employer’s directions, when he choked on a piece of meat. The court affirmed the award of compensation benefits but indicated that if the dinner had been the result of a distinct departure from business, compensation benefits would not have been allowed. In the case at bar, employee’s trip to the tavern was not made pursuant to his employer’s instructions. It was a distinctly personal venture neither authorized nor di*141rected by the employer. Because employee was motivated by a personal rather than a business purpose, the reasoning in Snyder is not applicable.
Footnote 8 of the majority opinion indicates that injuries resulting from reasonable or foreseeable conduct are not compen-sable if they do not arise out of the course of the employment. The majority also notes that tort concepts of reasonableness and foreseeability are, in general, not applicable to workers’ compensation cases. However, they find that compensation benefits should be awarded in this case because employee’s activities at the time of injury were “reasonable.”
It is clear that the majority opinion’s reasoning is inconsistent with prior decisions of this court that have held that the reasonableness or negligence of the employee’s conduct is irrelevant in determining whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. See e. g., Snyder v. General Paper Corp., 277 Minn. at 384, 152 N.W.2d at 748 (1967) (contributory negligence of employee immaterial); Radermacher v. St. Paul City Railway, 214 Minn. 427, 435, 8 N.W.2d 466, 470 (1943) (neither negligence of employer nor contributory negligence of employee relevant.)2 The majority opinion creates an exception for traveling employees, based on reasonable conduct, that will inject uncertainty into the application of the workers’ compensation statute. See Bradt, An Examination of the “Arising Out of” and the “in the Course of’ Requirements Under the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Law, 6 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 533, 564 (1980). Any further attempts to expand the classification of employees subject to this artificial distinction would establish a defense of contributory negligence specifically prohibited by our case law and by Minn.Stat. § 176.-021(1) (1980).
. A significant portion of the majority opinion also relies on authority from foreign jurisdictions which is contrary to the principles of workers’ compensation law established by pri- or Minnesota cases.
. Consistent with our case law, Professor Larson notes:
The right to compensation benefits depends on one simple test: Was there a work-connected injury? Negligence, and, for the most part, fault, are not in issue and cannot affect the result. Let the employer’s conduct be flawless in its perfection, and let the employee’s be abysmal in its clumsiness, rashness and ineptitude: if the accident arises out of and in the course of the employment, the employee receives his award. Reverse the positions, with a careless and stupid employer and a wholly innocent employee: the same award issues.
1 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensa-don § 2.10, at 5 (1978).