dissenting.
I readily acknowledge that, as stated by the majority, neither the State of Indiana nor the Monroe Cireuit Court was bound by the terms of the Illinois plea agreement.
Nevertheless, because the Monroe Circuit Court was permitted under Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3 (Burns Code Ed. Supp.2006) to order a portion of the suspended sentence to be executed rather than the entire five years and fifteen days, I would hold that the court should have done so.
The clearly stated determination made by the Illinois court was that the Indiana sentence and the Illinois sentence were to be served concurrently.1 The principle of judicial comity calls for the courts of one state to "give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another." 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Lows § 16 (1998) (emphasis supplied). See Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc. v. Centaur Rosecroft, 815 N.E.2d 513, 519 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).
As long ago stated by our Supreme Court in Sweigart v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 168, 12 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ind.1988):
"Courts of justice in one state should out of comity help to enforce the laws of another state when by such enforcement they will not violate their own laws or inflict an injury on some one of their own citizens."
The doctrine of comity should be applied in this case. To order only a portion of the suspended Indiana sentence, in effect giving credit for having served his Illinois sentence, would violate no Indiana law nor would it do injury to any other Indiana citizen.
I would reverse and remand with instructions to modify the judgment in accordance with this opinion.
. The Illinois judgment recited: "It is further ordered that the sentence imposed on count one above be served concurrent with the sentence imposed in case number 53C06-0203-FC-00375 in the Circuit Court of Monroe County, Indiana." App. at 20.