(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although the term “lemon” is colorfully descriptive, it is of little assistance in determining whether the tractor was so defective that there was a jury question on the issue whether the exclusive remedy contained in paragraph G of the purchase order failed of its essential purpose. After distilling plaintiff’s testimony (at least fifty percent of which could be characterized as a Joycean stream of consciousness) to its essential facts, I conclude that the trial court correctly analyzed the factual situation in ruling on appellees’ motion for directed verdict. As one who spent a good portion of his youth imprecating the manufacturers of farm equipment, I share with the trial court a feeling of sympathy for appellant. On the other hand, I am satisfied from the record that as a matter of law appellees fulfilled their obligations under the terms of the sales contract. It is clear from the service bulletins included in the record that John Deere experienced a number of component failures in the early units of this particular tractor series. It advised its dealers accordingly and supplied the dealers with the necessary replacement parts. Likewise, I find no evidence in the record that Nelson Implement was not reasonably prompt in repairing the tractor when notified of a particular defect or malfunction. When viewed in the aggregate, the problems that appellant experienced with the tractor might seem to paint a picture of a totally unusable piece of equipment. When examined singly and in the perspective of the sequence in which they occurred and were repaired, however, these defects are more properly viewed as a series of exas*240perating but understandable problems. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling that the exclusive remedy did not fail of its essential purpose.
I agree with the majority opinion’s treatment of the consequential damages issue and the counterclaim.