Defendant was convicted by a jury of uttering and publishing a forged instrument in violation of MCL 750.249; MSA 28.446. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of from 8 to 14 years and appeals as a matter of right.
Defendant claims that the examining magistrate failed to exercise properly his discretion in granting a continuance of the preliminary examination. MCL 766.7; MSA 28.925. This claim of error is based on the failure of the prosecutor to fully inform the judge of the reasons for the prosecutor’s request for a continuance. Even if error, defendant has not shown any prejudice stemming therefrom. To merit reversal for violation of MCL 766.7; MSA 28.925, a defendant must show prejudice. People v Bersine, 48 Mich App 295, 300; 210 NW2d 501 (1973), lv den 391 Mich 837. (1974), People v Robinson, 41 Mich App 259, 266-267; 199 NW2d 878 (1972).
Defendant’s claim that his right to remain silent was denied by the admission of evidence concerning his failure to exculpate himself while undergoing custodial interrogation must also be rejected. Defendant made an earlier statement and was questioned about the inconsistency between the earlier statement and his testimony at trial. The facts of this case do not come within the rule of *216People v Bobo, 390 Mich 355; 212 NW2d 190 (1973). People v Whitty, 96 Mich App 403, 420; 292 NW2d 214 (1980), People v Richendollar, 85 Mich App 74, 82; 270 NW2d 530 (1978), lv den 405 Mich 820 (1979), People v Baldwin, 74 Mich App 700, 709-712; 254 NW2d 619 (1977), rev’d on other grounds 405 Mich 550 (1979).
Defendant’s final claim of error is that the trial court erred in admitting similar-acts testimony involving other checks defendant and Carolyn Olejnicjck were alleged to have attempted to cash.1 The evidence was ruled admissible only to impeach Ms. Olejnicjck, and the jury was immediately instructed as to this fact. Thus, no error occurred up to this point in the trial. However, the evidence admitted to impeach Ms. Olejnicjck was extensively referred to by the prosecutor during closing argument. The nature of these comments raises a serious question whether defendant was thus denied a fair trial.2
During closing argument, the prosecutor commented as follows on the similar-acts evidence:
"Pay no attention to the other checks, he is only on trial for the one. The one was plucked out of the others *217for various reasons which are legally not the concern of this jury. There are little technicalities which are designed originally to protect the rights of defendants and invaribly [sic] used by the defense counsel to protect his wrongs, not his rights.
"You see, it is admitted there is no question, as the Court told you, the defendant is not on trial for anything involving those other checks. But you see what counsel saw fit to overlook are the dates of the other checks, February the 3rd, February the 4th. What is the date of the check involved in this case? February the 3rd. Don’t you think there is some connection? Doesn’t it show the intention of the parties? Doesn’t it show a pattern of action acted upon by all of these individuals, a scheme they all engaged in within a few days?
"But as long as he brings that up, let’s see, we have People’s Exhibit No. 1, the date February the 3rd. You heard me cross-examine Mr. Haines when he was on the witness stand about a check dated February the 4th, about another one dated February the 3rd, about another one dated February the 4th. Those checks wouldn’t be in Carl Plantz’s possession for one reason, they are in the possession of the police, if you will remember the testimony.”
There are several seriously prejudicial statements contained in the foregoing comments. First, the "little technicalities” to which the prosecutor referred involve the dismissal of the only other check charge brought against defendant because of insufficient evidence. This statement was misleading because the jury could easily have inferred that the prosecutor was in a position to know the truth about why the defendant had been charged with the instant offense and no others. It was prejudicial because it invited the jury to rely on the prosecutor’s special knowledge about the other *218check charges and convict defendant on this charge so that he would not escape punishment due to "little technicalities”.
The similar-acts evidence to which the prosecutor referred was not admitted to show a scheme or plan. Rather, it was admitted by the trial court "solely for the purpose of [the jury] weighing, evaluating and determining the credibility of th[e] witness * * *”. And yet, the prosecutor used the evidence to buttress his case against defendant. See, MRE 404(b). As this was clearly not the purpose for which the evidence was admitted, "it could not be considered as substantive evidence of [defendant’s] intent or knowledge in the instant case”. People v Lytal, 96 Mich App 140, 154; 292 NW2d 498 (1980). Moreover, because the prosecutor waited until rebuttal closing argument to raise the subject, defense counsel had no opportunity to respond thereto.
Because defense counsel made no objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument comments, review could be precluded absent a finding that a curative instruction would not have eliminated the resultant prejudice or that the comments denied defendant his right to a fair trial. People v Rone (On Remand), 101 Mich App 811; 300 NW2d 705 (1980). We find both that a curative instruction would not have eliminated the prejudice resulting from the prosecutor’s comments and that such statements denied defendant his right to a fair trial.
In Lytal, supra, 153, evidence of a prior conviction was admitted solely on the issue of defendant’s credibility. The trial court so instructed the jury at the close of the trial, and thus the prosecutor’s closing argument, that the prior conviction was evidence of defendant’s guilt, was ruled harm*219less error because any prejudice could have been eliminated by a timely requested curative instruction. Id., 154. In the instant case, the trial court initially instructed the jury as to the limited purpose of the similar-acts evidence, but no such instruction was given during the formal jury instructions at the close of trial one day later. Thus, the last input received by the jury as to the other checks was the prosecutor’s comments that such checks reflected the defendant’s intent, pattern of action, and scheme. Because this evidence was not admitted for such purpose and because the remainder of the quoted comments were highly prejudicial to defendant, we are persuaded that reversal is required.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Bronson, P.J., concurred.Although the trial court and the attorneys both below and on appeal refer to the objectionable testimony as "similar acts” for impeachment, this is not a correct characterization of the evidence. Similar-acts evidence which is admissible pursuant to MRE 404(b) is admissible for some limited substantive purpose and not impeachment. If the evidence was admissible at all, it was admissible pursuant to MRE 608(b) as a specific instance of conduct probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. Moreover, the trial court should have considered whether the testimony was more prejudicial than probative pursuant to MRE 403. Finally, since defendant had not yet testified, the series of questions which also impugned his credibility should not have been allowed. Instead, the questions should have been asked solely in reference to what Ms. Olejnicjck had done.
Defendant raised this issue in a brief appended to a motion for permission to file a supplemental brief, which was granted by order dated January 30, 1981.