(dissenting). I do not find error requiring reversal in this case and would affirm defendant’s conviction. I agree with the majority on the first two issues raised and disagree with their conclusion on the third issue.
The test for whether erroneous testimony or argument admitted at a criminal jury trial without objection constitutes error requiring reversal is whether a miscarriage of justice would result. People v Lytal, 96 Mich App 140, 154; 292 NW2d 498 (1980). I find that a proper instruction would have cured any error in this case and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.
In presenting the case in chief, the prosecutor called defendant’s 16-year-old girlfriend accomplice, Carolyn Olejnicjck, who testified that she wrote out the checks at defendant’s direction. On redirect the plaintiff asked her about other checks *220allegedly forged and presented for payment at approximately the same time as the check on which defendant was being tried. Defense counsel objected to the testimony, and the prosecutor explained that he was offering the testimony for the following reason:
"And in view of the testimony that this witness just gave on cross-examination, they would certainly would be material as to the scheme, plan, pattern of the conduct of these individuals, including this defendant, with reference to the things she just testified to as to the true intent of the parties.”
The court then overruled the objection but later instructed the jury as follows:
"I do want to precaution [sic] you jurors that this questioning that is being put to this witness is solely for the purpose of your weighing, evaluating and determining the credibility of this witness, not to make a decision as to whether or not those other crimes actually happened. This defendant is not on trial for any of those prior checks.”
Defendant’s attorney reserved making an opening statement and offered no theory of defense until the prosecutor rested his case, whereupon he told the jury that the defendánt had permission from Carl Plantz, owner of the account on which the checks were drawn, to write the check in question. He further advised that there was no intent to defraud Carl Plantz. Defendant testified that he had permission to write and cash the check with which he was charged but was not a party to making out or cashing any other checks not signed by Carl Plantz. This testimony was inconsistent with a statement made to Detective Sergeant Deering, a rebuttal witness called by the *221prosecutor. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor calling Detective Sergeant Deering to give testimony under the similar-acts statute and the court overruled the objection stating:
"If there ever was a case to justify the Similar Acts Statute, this is it. And simply to argue that it is prejudicial isn’t good enough, as far as I am concerned. Everything is prejudicial in a lawsuit. Whether it is improperly prejudicial is the question, or unfairly prejudicial.
"The fact of the matter is, the statute covers similar acts, whether or not the party was convicted of them, to show lack of mistake, to show motive, scheme, design, intent.
"The jury will be properly charged and they will still have the bottom line question. And that is: Whether or not it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and everyone [sic] of the elements equate with the defendant being guilty in this case. And the jury can still disregard, if they wish to, prior acts or subsequent acts of the defendant that are properly brought out. The probative value, obviously, outweighs the prejudicial impact.
"The motion is denied.”
Part way through Detective Deering’s testimony the court instructed the jury on its use, saying:
"While the witness is looking for that name, I want to charge you jurors about this testimony relative to other checks that may or may not infer [sic] that the defendant had been engaged in some other illegal acts.
"It is being brought to your attention at this time for purposes of attacking the credibility of the defendant who testified on the witness stand. You are to receive the testimony only for that purpose as to whether or not you want to bring it into play when you apply what weight you as jurors apply to the testimony of witnesses.
"You are not to consider this as being proof that he *222committed this particular crime or those, for that matter.”
Thus, the prosecutor on two separate occasions was permitted by the court to offer evidence under the similar-acts statute and on both occasions the court improperly instructed the jury on the limitation of use they were to make of that testimony.
MCL 768.27; MSA 28.1050 and MRE 404(b) are alike in their permissive use of similar acts to show motive, intent, scheme, plan, or system. I do not find that one modifies the other. Similar-acts evidence has been ruled properly admissible by this Court in a charge of conspiracy to utter and publish a forged check, People v Nawrocki, 6 Mich App 46; 150 NW2d 516 (1967), cert den 389 US 942; 88 S Ct 304; 19 L Ed 2d 296 (1967), to show intent and lack of accident in an embezzlement charge, People v Streetman, 59 Mich App 49; 228 NW2d 539 (1975), to show identity in an armed robbery charge, People v Jones, 83 Mich App 559; 269 NW2d 224 (1978), and by the Supreme Court in People v Duncan, 402 Mich 1; 260 NW2d 58 (1977), to show intent in the charge of conspiracy to do a legal act in an illegal manner and solicitation of a bribe.
Similar-acts evidence properly is admitted in a prosecution’s case in chief, People v Bates, 94 Mich App 568; 288 NW2d 655 (1980), and has been admitted properly by cross-examination of the defendant to show intent where defendant testified that he had no intent to commit embezzlement. Streetman, supra. The defense attorney here made no opening statement and gave no theory of defense until after the prosecutor had rested his case. At that time, permission and lack of intent became the defense. I agree with the trial judge who, when ruling on defendant’s motion, stated:
*223"If there ever was a case to justify the Similar Acts Statute, this is it.”
Unfortunately, the trial court did not instruct the jury properly on the use of similar-acts evidence and gave no instruction on the limited use of this testimony at the conclusion of the trial. No objection was made by defense counsel to the improper instruction when given or the failure to instruct at the conclusion of the case. At that time, the defendant gave verbal approval to the instructions given. Nor was any objection given to the "common plan, scheme, and intent” final argument given by the prosecutor. This Court held in Street-man, supra, 52-53, as follows:
"In the absence of request or proper objection, there is no absolute requirement that the trial judge give limiting instructions. People v Chism, 390 Mich 104; 211 NW2d 193 (1973).
"We hold, therefore, that the trial judge did not err in admitting evidence of a prior similar act. Nor was it reversible error to fail to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted, where, as here, there was no request for such instruction and no objection to the failure to instruct.”
I do find the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument improper:
"Pay no attention to the other checks, he is only on trial for the one. The one was plucked out of the others for various reasons which are legally not the concern of this jury. There are little technicalities which are designed originally to protect the rights of defendants and invaribly [sic] used by the defense counsel to protect his wrongs, not his rights.”
But I believe "any unduly prejudicial effect could have been eliminated by a curative instruction if one had been requested upon a timely objection”. Duncan, supra, 16-17.