(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I prefer to continue to limit the scope of official immunity for governmental employees by applying the . "ministerial-discretionary” distinction for acts committed within the scope of such employment. This standard has its roots in early Michigan common law, and our Supreme Court has never expressly departed from its application. As Judge Kelly recently stated in Layton v Quinn, 120 Mich App 708, 720-721; 328 NW2d 95 (1982):
"Established rules of law are not generally aban*463doned merely by implication. [Citation omitted.] Thus, we decline to follow the errant path of some panels of this Court which have abandoned the ministerial-discretionary test. The abolition of the standard would result in an unwarranted expansion of governmental immunity. Such an expansion should not be predicated merely on what a panel predicts 'four members of the Supreme Court would now hold.’ ”
I find this to be especially true in light of the significant changes in the present makeup of the Supreme Court. It is not possible to divine whether the Supreme Court will abandon application of the ministerial-discretionary standard and, there being no other persuasive legal or policy reasons advanced by those who favor abandoning such a standard, I prefer to adhere to its application.
Thus, I continue to hold that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of defendant Police Chief Walter Krasny. As Chief of Police at the Ann Arbor facility, defendant Krasny was required to enforce the regulations which apply to that facility. This was a ministerial duty of his office, a violation of which is not protected by any official immunity.