dissenting.
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the majority opinion nor the rationale used to reach that conclusion. Neither the pleadings nor the evidence indicate that the parties relied upon the rejection by the Grosses on the loan forms of credit life insurance. Rather, the issues centered around other insurance policies on the lives of the Grosses, delivered to the Bank, on some of which policies the Bank was named as beneficiary to the extent of the Bank’s interest. Furthermore, I do not read the trial judge’s order for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as relying upon the rejection by the Grosses of credit life insurance as the basis for his disposition of the matter.
*146Although the evidence supporting Ketc-ham’s position may not be conclusive, I believe there is some evidence to support the jury verdict. I do not intend to further elaborate on the evidence, although much of the evidence upon which Ketcham relied is only fleetingly referred to in the majority opinion. On the basis of the rationale in Bergquist-Walker Real Estate, Inc. v. William Clairmont, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 414 (N.D.1983), and Okken v. Okken, 325 N.W.2d 264 (N.D.1982), in which we analyzed the standards to be used in reviewing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, I would reverse the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The trial court apparently denied the motion in the alternative for a new trial because the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted. It is apparent from reading the trial judge’s memorandum opinion that he believed the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict is one of the specific causes for granting a new trial. Rule 59(b)(6), N.D.R.Civ.P.; Bergquist-Walker Real Estate, Inc. v. William Clairmont, Inc., supra; Okken v. Okken, supra. I can only conclude that if the judgment notwithstanding the verdict were to be reversed the trial court would have granted the motion in the alternative for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence. I would therefore reverse the order denying the alternative motion for a new trial and remand to the trial court for a new trial.