DISPOSITION ON THE MERITS
Elvick appeals from the judgment, claiming that the parol evidence rule “compels acceptance of both [the $50,000.00 and $59,-500.00 notes] and bars any modification of these unconditional promises to pay based on oral testimony from Bye.” Elvick also argues that the parol evidence rule prohibits consideration by the trial court and this court of the oral testimony offered to determine the parties’ intentions concerning debt resolution at the land closing. Elvick contends that the findings of fact based upon inadmissible parol evidence are clearly erroneous.
At the outset we note that a review of those portions of the transcript provided for the appeal indicates that Elvick failed to object to oral testimony concerning the notes.3 Failure to impose a proper and timely objection to oral testimony under the parol evidence rule, however, is not a waiver of the right to challenge the evidence on appeal. Gajewski v. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614, 630 (N.D.1974).
Without question, the accounts given by Elvick, Bye, and the other witnesses regarding the intentions of the parties concerning the land sale transaction constitute parol evidence. The parol evidence rule is set forth in § 9-06-06, NDCC and provides that:
“The execution of a contract in writing, whether the law required it to be written or not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.”
Parol evidence is “inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of a written contract between the parties to the contract.” Schwarting v. Schwarting, 310 N.W.2d 738, 739 (N.D.1981) quoting Dardis v. Eddy Brothers, 223 N.W.2d 674, 679 (N.D.1974). If, however, an ambiguity exists in the contract, parol evidence is admissible to explain existing essential terms or to show the parties’ intent. Atlas Ready-Mix of Minot v. White Properties, 306 N.W.2d 212, 220 (N.D.1981). The terms of a contract are ambiguous when the language is subject to more than one construction or “when good arguments can be made for either of two contrary positions as to the *112meaning of a term in a document.” Atlas Ready-Mix, supra, 306 N.W.2d at 220. See also McDonald v. Antelope Land and Cattle Co., 294 N.W.2d 391, 394 (N.D.1980). When you have a mass of documents and conversations which together constitute the agreement, and the parties’ intent cannot be clearly ascertained from the written documents alone, “reference must then be made to extrinsic evidence, and those questions in regard to which extrinsic evidence is adduced are questions of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.” Thomas C. Roel Associates, Inc. v. Henrikson, 295 N.W.2d 136, 137 (N.D.1980).
After reviewing the court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and those portions of the transcript before us, it is impossible to say that the court relied heavily, if at all, upon the disputed testimony in reaching its decision. The court could have relied on evidence that might be found in the parts of the transcript not furnished, which may have implied that Elvick would not be relieved from his existing obligations after the land was transferred to Bye, and which was not objected to. Even if the court had integrated the parol evidence as a part of its reasoning, this court has held that a judgment will not be reversed merely because it rests upon inapplicable reasons. Damm v. National Insurance Company of America, 200 N.W.2d 616 (N.D.1972). Furthermore, it appears that Bye did not rely solely upon the disputed parol testimony to persuade the trial court and this court that Elvick would remain obligated for his debts after the land sale.
In light of the above discussion, we conclude that the harmless-error rule, Rule 61, NDRCivP, precludes this court from disturbing the judgment of the trial court “in any way if the court did rely on inadmissible parol evidence in reaching its decision.” Robar v. Ellingson, 301 N.W.2d 653, 659 (N.D.1981). See also Zimmer v. Bellon, 153 N.W.2d 757, 763 (N.D.1967) (erroneous admission of parol evidence held not prejudicial under the circumstances of the case). Moreover, even if the parol evidence had been clearly admissible, the fact remains that Elvick and Bye contradicted one another concerning what was decided during their land sale negotiations. When this court reviews oral testimony before the trial court we are governed by Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, and we will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Robar, supra, 301 N.W.2d at 659. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court, after considering the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Gross v. Sta-Rite Industries, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 679, 682 (N.D.1982). The trial court’s findings of fact on appeal are given the same weight as a jury verdict. Stee v. “L” Monte Industries, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 641 (N.D.1976). A finding is not clearly erroneous merely because we might have reached a different result had we tried the case. Anderson v. Mooney, 279 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1979). We conclude that any findings of the trial court which could be linked to the parol evidence are not clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., and VANDE WALLE, SAND and PAULSON, JJ., concur.. Elvick did object on the basis of the parol evidence rule during testimony about the second mortgage and the farm lease on Elvick’s land.