specially concurring:
I specially concur because the majority opinion tacitly overlooks critical limitations expressed in People v. Sims, 245 Ill. App. 3d 221 (3d Dist. 1993), and People v. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d 904 (2d Dist. 2003). See 226 Ill. 2d at 477. Sims and Harrell narrowly apply the statutory phrase “from the person” in limited situations. Although ostensibly agreeing with Sims and Harrell, the majority adopts a broader interpretation without addressing its implicit expansion of the scope of that phrase.
Sims expressly held that, in addition to property taken from the victim’s person, theft from the person included takings “when the victim has been detained or searched *** or when the victim’s privacy has been directly invaded at the time the property is taken [citation].” (Emphases added.) Sims, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 224. Applying that rule, the Sims court reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding that theft from the person did not include the taking of the victim’s purse from her shopping cart while she was standing a few feet away, unaware of the theft. In reaching this conclusion, the court factually distinguished People v. Jackson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 394 (5th Dist. 1987), where the victim was pushed against his car and searched before the defendant removed a wallet and other property from inside the car.
Expressly relying on the rationale in Sims, the Harrell court reached a different result, upholding the defendant’s conviction. Harrell concluded that the facts were closer to those in Jackson than to Sims, because “the victim’s privacy was directly invaded” in Harrell. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 909. The court concluded the victim “was obviously aware of the theft” when defendant reached around her to take her purse from the shopping cart. Harrell, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 909.
Accordingly, in both Sims and Harrell, when the taking is not from the victim’s actual person the key to the analysis is whether the victim had been detained or searched or suffered an invasion of privacy. Unfortunately, without discussing these analytical limitations, the majority adopts a broader interpretation of the victim’s “presence,” including all takings of property under the victim’s “control and protection.” 226 Ill. 2d at 479. Although that interpretation could presumably produce a different outcome in Sims, the majority does not broach this possibility, nor does it expressly reject the limitations adopted in Sims and Harrell. Therefore, because I believe these considerations merit examination by this court, I cannot fully join the majority opinion.
Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that defendant was properly convicted of theft from the person even under the analysis in Sims and Harrell. Defendant directly invaded the victim’s privacy by taking money from the bar when the seated victim removed his hand to light a cigarette. Thus, I specially concur in the majority opinion.