also dissenting:
I dissent. In a display of clairvoyant skills worthy of the Barnum and Bailey Circus in its heyday, the majority has ascertained the true intent of the legislature in the enactment of section 7(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.7(a)). By means of this heretofore unrevealed ability to discern legislative intent, the application of two newly created rules of statutory interpretation, and the failure to follow established rules of statutory construction, the majority has completely distorted the plain and unambiguous language of section 7(a).
The first new rule promulgated by the majority for the interpretation of statutes is that the possibility that, under certain circumstances, the application of a clearly stated unambiguous statute may effect a result deemed by the majority to be “anomalous” “demonstrates that at least a latent ambiguity exists in the statute.” 115 Ill. 2d at 340.
The second rule is that the statement of a provision in the negative renders the statute ambiguous. The rationale, as stated by the majority, is:
"The very fact that the remarriage provision of the statute is stated in the negative in itself creates an ambiguity. The provision does not state what is to occur in the event that a surviving spouse remarries if the decedent left children who are eligible for benefits at the time of such remarriage; it only states what is to occur if the decedent did not leave children who are eligible for benefits at the time of the surviving spouse’s remarriage.” (Emphasis in original.) 115 Ill. 2d at 340.
This court has repeatedly stated the general rule applicable here. In Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 136, the court said:
“The language of a statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. ‘It is a primary rule in the interpretation and construction of statutes that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. [Citations.] This is to be done primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. [Citations.] There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.’ Western National Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer [1960], 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350.” 66 Ill. 2d 136, 139-40.
The majority pays lip service to this concept but, citing City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, Fitzsimmons v. Norgle (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 369, and People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, in support of its newly cited rules, proceeds to “ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent.” (115 Ill. 2d at 341.) The cases cited by the majority are not in point. People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, involved a statute which this court stated was “ ‘reasonably susceptible’ to both interpretations urged.” (94 Ill. 2d 138, 141.) City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 336, involved a statute which could be interpreted in two ways and required construction in order to determine whether an appointment to fill a vacancy was properly made. The court there stated that the judicial role is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to give it effect, and in so doing it will examine the entire statute, assuming that it first finds an ambiguity which requires construction. Fitzsimmons v. Norgle (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 369, makes it clear that, absent an ambiguity, there is no need for construction.
The statute here involved provides:
“In the event of the remarriage of a widow or widower, where the decedent did not leave surviving any child or children who, at the time of such remarriage, are entitled to compensation benefits under this Act, the surviving spouse shall be paid a lump sum equal to 2 years compensation benefits and all further rights of such widow or widower shall be extinguished.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.7(a).)
There is no ambiguity nor is there any indication that the General Assembly intended that there be any difference in the situation of a widow who was the mother of the surviving children and a widow who was not.
Section 7(a) provides for an award of benefits and provides for an exception to the right to receive benefits in a single specific situation. The majority disregards the long-established rule that “an expression of certain exceptions in a statute is construed as an exclusion of all others.” (People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 191, 199.) Had the General Assembly intended the result conjured up by the majority, it would have been a simple matter to include the exception in the statute.
Section 7(a) was considered in Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 181. The court said:
“It is obvious that Interlake’s argument is contrary to the plain language of the statute. The statute provides for the payment of death benefits until the widow dies, or until the children reach 18, whichever is later. If, however, the widow remarries when none of the decedent’s children are entitled to compensation, she is to receive a lump sum of two years’ compensation and then her rights are extinguished. Under the language of the section, Frieda, as the decedent’s widow, is entitled to benefits until she dies, because she did not remarry at a time when none of the decedent’s children were entitled to support. There simply is no provision in the statute for terminating a widow’s benefits upon remarriage when there remain minor children entitled to support.” (Emphasis in original.) 95 Ill. 2d 181, 191.
The conclusion reached by the majority concerning the alleged failure to consider the consequences of the statute is extraordinary. Its comments concerning the presumption upon which the statute, as amended by the majority, is purportedly based, are pure conjecture. Ordinarily, comments of this nature in an opinion are supported by citations to legislative journals or transcripts of debates, not, as here, by pure speculation.
The effect of the majority opinion is to engraft on a plainly stated unambiguous statute an exception which, had it intended to do so, could have been easily stated by the General Assembly.
The appellate court correctly construed the statute and its judgment should be affirmed.