dissenting:
The majority implies that the fact that the judge was fed up with counsel’s antics — “the last in a series of blatant indiscretions” (376 Ill. App. 3d at 864) — justifies the court’s sua sponte decision to declare a mistrial. While that may account for the court’s hasty reaction, it was defense counsel’s comment about the polygraph that required the judge’s careful consideration. No amount of frustration allows the court to forgo the deliberate process imperative in safeguarding the defendant’s constitutional rights against double jeopardy. Two minutes is two minutes. A judge cannot undertake the rigorous analysis required and arrive at a determination that manifest necessity warranted a mistrial in that extraordinarily short span of time. Despite the judge’s pronouncements and the majority’s contentions to the contrary, I do not believe that the court undertook any serious reflection or consideration of alternatives to preserve the trial’s fairness. Based on the facts in this case, the court did not demonstrate a manifest necessity for a mistrial. I believe that both Street and Dahlberg support this conclusion. People v. Street, 316 Ill. App. 3d 205 (2000); People v. Dahlberg, 355 Ill. App. 3d 308 (2005). For those reasons, I believe that the judge’s decision declaring a mistrial was clearly against logic and therefore an abuse of discretion. See People v. Largent, 337 Ill. App. 3d 835, 839 (2003). I would rule that double jeopardy barred a retrial of the defendant.