(dissenting, with whom Liacos, C.J., and Lynch, J., join). I dissent. In my view the record does not support the conclusion that the Tsagronises are aggrieved parties. I would dismiss the Tsagronises’ appeal.
*334To have standing to seek judicial review of the board’s decision, a party must qualify as a person aggrieved under G. L. c. 40A, § 17 (1990 ed.). See Green v. Board of Appeals of Provincetown, 404 Mass. 571, 572 (1989). Standing as an aggrieved party is jurisdictional, Marotta v. Board of Appeals of Revere, 336 Mass. 199, 203 (1957) (whether jurisdiction was raised before Superior Court is immaterial), and cannot be conferred by stipulation or waiver of the parties. First Christian Church v. Brownell, 332 Mass. 143, 148 (1955) (“[m]alters affecting the court’s jurisdiction are open for consideration without motion”).
The Tsagronises, as owners of property directly abutting the locus, are deemed to be “parties in interest” entitled to notice by mail of the hearing before the board on the For-resters’ application for a variance for the locus. G. L. c. 40 A, § 11 (1990 ed.). In Marotta v. Board of Appeals of Revere, supra, the court stated that parties in interest are rebuttably presumed to be persons aggrieved, and as such have standing to contest the granting of a variance. See, e.g., Paulding v. Bruins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 707 (1984) (abutting landowners, entitled to receive notice of public hearing under G. L. c. 40A, § 11, rebuttably presumed to be persons aggrieved). The court cautioned that if, as here, the status of plaintiffs as parties aggrieved is contested, “the point of jurisdiction will be determined on all the evidence with no benefit to the plaintiffs from the presumption as such.” Marotta, supra at 204, citing Krantz v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 335 Mass. 703 (1957). In emphasizing that the presumption ' of abutters’ aggrieved status is rebuttable, the court anticipated that there would be circumstances in which even direct abutters would not have standing as parties aggrieved. In my view this case presents such a situation.
The Tsagronises contend — and the court concludes — that their property would, decline in value if the variance were allowed. Yet the only evidence offered by the Tsagronises as to value was the deposition of Dimitrios Tsagronis. Tsagronis conceded that they purchased their unimproved lot for $90,000, and that after construction on the *335lot in the subdivision to the north of the Tsagronises’ lot, the Tsagronises’ lot and house were valued at $390,000. There was no evidence as to the value of the Tsagronises’ lot at the time of the hearing or what the value might be after construction of the Forresters’ house, or whether the value would diminish even more if the locus were used for purposes not requiring a variance.1
The Superior Court judge determined that the only basis on which the Tsagronises were aggrieved parties under G. L. c. 40A, § 17 (1990 ed.), was an allegation of diminution of light and air.2 That was error. Such an allegation is not only speculative but is also an inappropriate basis to qualify a party for aggrieved status. Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 46 (1977) (“in many, if not most, circumstances, the injury complained of may be too remote to make the party seeking review a ‘person aggrieved’ ”). The court stated in Nigro v. Jones, 332 Mass. 741, 744 (1955), that access to light and air is not a matter of right. The general rule is that in order to constitute a deprivation of light “there must be a substantial deprivation of light, enough to render the occupation of the house uncomfortable according to the ordinary notions of mankind.” Tomburo v. Liberty Freehold Theatre Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 513, 515 (1942). See G. L. c. 187, § 1 (1990 ed.). A mere allegation of diminution of light and air is not a substantial injury sufficient to make a party aggrieved. The Tsagronises’ *336other bases for asserting aggrieved party status are even less meritorious.3
Because on this record the presumption of aggrieved party status was rebutted, I would dismiss the appeal.3 4 I therefore respectfully dissent.
The disallowance of the variance would not prevent the Forresters from using the locus as, for example, a campground for Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, poor children, the Salvation Army, or for many other activities. The Wareham zoning by-law provides that, in a Residential R-43 District, “buildings, structures and premises may be used for one-family detached residential purposes, [and] any lawful religious, educational or non-profit recreational purpose" (emphasis supplied).
The judge stated that “allegations of diminution of light and air provide sufficient support to raise a challenge based upon a claim of real and substantial injury.”
The Tsagronises alleged that allowance of the variance would increase air pollution due to operation of the Forresters’ automobiles. The Forresters are entitled to use as many automobiles to get to and from their lot as they and their guests may need, regardless of the variance. The Forresters noted that Tsagronis had admitted that the location was windy, that Tsagronis does not know how many cars already use the cul-de-sac, and that he has never been concerned about, any air pollution already existing in and near his lot. See also 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 7.00. The Tsagronises alleged that allowance of a variance would increase erosion of their lot. The Tsagronises admitted that their lot was not currently experiencing erosion even though a septic system, a foundation and a first floor had been constructed on the locus a number of years ago. The Tsagronises also alleged harm based on the location of the Forresters’ septic system. The Forresters point to Tsagronis’s acknowledgment that he does not know of any flaws in design or construction; Tsagronis also stated that an engineer with whom he consulted affirmed that the specifications of the Forresters’ septic system conformed to legal requirements. In sum, the record indicates that the Tsagronises are not aggrieved parties.
As I read note 4 of the court’s opinion, the court has replaced the rebuttable presumption found in G. L. c. 40A, § 17 (1990 ed.), with an automatic standing rule.